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
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IN

PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 2, No. 5, pp. 103-186

February 4, 1913

THE METAPHYSICS OF HISTORICAL
KNOWLEDGE

BY

DEWITT H. PARKER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to determine the character and object of our knowledge of the past. Such an enquiry ought to lead to results of interest not only in themselves but also for the general problem of knowledge. For, in the case of knowledge of the past, all the difficulties of the epistemological problem become acute; a reference to this field serves as a ready touchstone for testing the various theories of knowledge.

The pursuit of this problem cannot be kept separate from that of another—the metaphysics of time. A term which has an intimate relation to another term cannot be studied apart from

the latter. If knowledge is some sort of relation between subject and object, its nature cannot fail to be affected by the kind of being possessed by the object: an epistemology inevitably involves an ontology; the existential status of the past is in the highest degree important for the determination of the knowledge of the past. This will form an equally important part of our enquiry.

Our procedure will be briefly as follows. We shall begin with an elementary analysis of the knowledge of the past. This will lead to certain difficulties, on the one hand epistemological, on the other hand metaphysical. After a solution of the former, the consideration of the latter will involve a discussion of the nature of time. This will occupy a large part of our space, and unavoidably somewhat interrupt our progress. Lastly, however, the epistemological enquiry will be resumed, and followed into its ultimate issues.

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge of the past is of two fundamentally different varieties: through memory, and through report, meaning by the latter all knowledge communicated to one whether by word of mouth of an eye-witness or through history and tradition. There is, of course, a third variety, knowledge through inference, such as knowledge of past geological epochs. Yet this last, despite its distinctive character as inference, is, for our present purpose, reducible to memory or report. For all inference proceeds, through analogy or induction, on the basis of observations made by the investigator, to obtain which one must depend on one's own perception and memory or on the reports of one's fellows. We will consider the nature of each of these varieties.

The memory experience partakes of the directness of original experience. It is intimate, personal, warm as the original with the warmth of our own life. The original experience and the memory experience seem to be of one identical stuff. To be sure, memory is not so full—many a detail is wanting, the outline is

hazy, and much of the vividness of the original is gone. Nevertheless, so much as is there is there in the flesh. Call up any vivid remembrance, and see if this is not true.

We might, indeed, apply "the exclusion of the introjection" in the case of memory, just as Avenarius¹ applied it to perception. You think, we might say to the adherent of the contrary view, that the content of your memory is other than the content of the original experience, because you have fallen into the vulgar and egregious error of supposing that your experience is in your head. And this you do the more readily in the case of memories, because, unlike your perceptions, neither you nor your *Mitmensch* can find them here in the space of direct experience. But if you take the content of your memory "as it is given" and "describe it as you find it," you will easily convince yourself that inside of your head you could never discover the memory of your experience, and that the experience itself, when you think of it, belongs to the space and time world of your past, as well as, in another sense, to that of your present experience. Immediate experience thus testifies that, when we remember, we are again in the past. Between memory and original experience no dividing line can be drawn. The one is simply a modification of, a change in, the other. Brain physiology lends support to this view, in its teaching that there is probably no distinction between the sensory and the memorial areas.

But is not this result contradicted by the well-known fact of the uniqueness of mental states? Memory and original experience may be of the same character, but they are not for that reason of the same substance. Once lived, an experience is done with; the memory of it is a different experience, numerically distinct, with a different date and a different setting. One can never have again the same experience.

This objection, although backed by much authority, is a mere dogma. It is, moreover, incompatible with the identity and continuity of the self, indefeasible facts of immediate experience, which presuppose that elements of consciousness remain identical despite change and passage of time. If, after a night's sleep, a man were to awaken with sensations and purposes and mem-

¹ *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff.*

ories all distinct from those which he possessed when he went to bed, he could not, except by a misuse of language which betrays the falsity of the hypothesis, be called the same man. The possibility of the real identity of psychical elements at different dates has been denied, not because it is counter to experience or to the facts, but because of a fear of assimilating the psychical to the physical, because of the acceptance of a new form of spiritualistic psychology. Despite the supposed uniqueness of moments of time, it has not seemed absurd to think of a physical thing as remaining identical through various instants and changes, as witness the case of simple motion; or to believe that the "elements" persist despite apparent loss or recombination. For our immediate experience, the self has the same sort of identity as a physical thing. Just as, when unsophisticated, we speak of the same thing as being here now or there then, so we speak of the same thought or memory as now in mind, then as no longer present, yet as now again in consciousness. Our purposes and affections are, for us, the same, quite literally and exactly, through the years and the vicissitudes of the years. Moreover, on all grounds, insight points to the essential identity of physical and psychical. When once this is questioned, the problem of mind and body becomes insoluble, and resort is had to the various forms of dualism, with all their difficulties. The believers in the uniqueness of mental states reduce the identity of the self to the identity of the brain or the objects in which the self is interested, which implies the acceptance, however veiled, of epiphenomenalism.

That in turn there are difficulties in the thesis here maintained, I do not deny. It requires, I admit, the recasting of many of our conceptions of time and existence. With the consideration of its difficulties and its metaphysical implications we shall have later to do. We postpone them at present, because they involve the whole time problem. At present it suffices for us to recognize, as the cardinal principle of all epistemological investigation, that the deliverances of immediate experience cannot be gainsaid. Logical constructions must be based on these; and when logic and experience seem to be at variance, let us not discount experience; let us rather re-examine our logic. The two cannot remain at variance, nor can we be satisfied with their disagreement. That

they are not actually so, will be one result of our investigation. We shall show that what experience teaches—that the original and the memorial experiences are the same, that a past experience is also a present experience—is also the teaching of metaphysical, logical construction.

Let us now examine the knowledge of the past which comes to us from report, using this term in the inclusive sense already defined. Let us consider such knowledge as is nearest to memory. Another tells me, from memory, of his own experience. What then are the characteristics of my knowledge of his past? What I get from him are certain conceptual ideas, identical in his mind and mine, coming to me through the so-called interpretation of his words and gestures. These I render vivid and full by associating therewith a mass of imagery whose substance has been derived from my own individual experiences. The place of this imagery is filled in his knowledge of his own past by memories, which, as we have seen, are of the stuff of the original experience which he reports. Here then is the difference between his knowledge of his own past and mine. So far as he portrays his past through concepts—and all description is such a portrayal—he is knowing it through a material which is other than his memory, and *a fortiori* other than the past experience itself; and I, in receiving this through communication, know in the same terms. But in his memories, the concrete filling of his description, he relives the past, whereas I, through imagination, can picture it only through signs which, though similar, are other than that which is signified. Another man's memory cannot become mine, any more than his past can become my past—this he cannot give me through communication. The same facts are of course true when I read the written report of an eye-witness. When Rousseau describes the aqueduct which he built under the roots of a tree in his uncle's yard, however vivid the description, it is not his memory that I get, but his conceptualized description. The difference here is the same as that between my knowledge of San Francisco before I was there and that which I have now that I have seen the city. The one was purely conceptual, derived from the descriptions of others, made vivid and full by means of imagery derived from experiences of similar places which I had

seen, supplemented by photographs and paintings. The other is of the stuff of San Francisco itself. The difference in the character of the recognition of an object from a description, and the recognition of it when one has already seen it, points back to the fundamental distinction which we have been elaborating. "Familiarity" implies the reawakening of an experience that one has already possessed. There is a principal difference between even the most fragmentary experience and the most accurate description of it. It is like that between picture and original.

In the case of knowledge derived from most so-called history, one is even further removed from the original experiences described. To be sure, such knowledge has its ultimate source in the reports of eye-witnesses. But it does not reach us unalloyed. It comes reinterpreted, remoulded by the private thoughts of the historian. And however accurate the story may be, I no more relive those experiences than I behold my friend in the photograph.

It would seem, then, that knowledge of the past illustrates the truth of both of the chief theories of knowledge—in memory, of the presentative, in report, of the representative. According to the first, the content of the knowing process is numerically other than the object known, and the two have an external relation to each other. According to the second, the immanent content is part of the object, whence the latter is itself partly immanent, and the relation between the two intimate. The object known is, on the former view, transcendent; knowledge is a correspondence between the immanent content and the object. According to the latter, the object is the whole of which the immanent content is a part, and knowledge is the being in mind of such a part. It is usually assumed that either one or the other of these theories must be true. Yet the difference between them is not absolute. Like all other natural distinctions, it is fluid—a matter of more or less. In all varieties of knowledge, as will be shown in some detail farther on, both are interwoven. We have asserted that in all report there is given to us, not the immediate experiences, but the conceptualized description of these; just as when one looks at a scene and describes it to us, one does not give us the scene itself—or one's own visual sensations—but one's

ideas of it. Yet this is not quite the truth. The original experience is partially, although very partially, communicated. For the substance of all ideas consists of one's original experiences. The concept is elaborated out of this material. The past event which one describes has entered, however fragmentarily, into the description. The concept is the quintessence of all one's experience, of this as well as of the past.

Hence, so far as the report is that of an eye-witness, the knowledge received through it is, at least to a minute extent, presentative. Even when it is second-hand "history," some touch of the original remains. In a quite literal sense, if only to a minute extent, we all share our experiences with one another and possess as a heritage those of the generations. Yet the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge remains. The idea that is used in representative knowledge is for the most part a copy, not the original itself. The concept which is used to describe an experience, being the precipitate of all one's experiences, is remoulded only to a small, sometimes to an infinitesimal extent, by this particular one. To be accurate, however, we should speak, not of presentative knowledge through memory and representative knowledge through report, but of more or less presentative or representative knowledge. For the converse fact is true—there are representative elements in so-called memory. Not all is strictly memory, much is interpretation, "imagination," and, what is more important, there are always conceptual elements, characterizations, that is, judgments, recognitions as "this" or "that," of "this sort" or of "that sort," and whatever else there be of simultaneous running comment. Nevertheless, since each kind of knowledge is preponderantly of one character, we are justified in speaking shortly of presentative and of representative knowledge.

It will have been observed that thus far we have treated only of the knowledge of past *experience*. What of the knowledge of past physical *events*, say of the Lisbon earthquake, or of past geologic ages before there was any human experience? Since, of course, all knowledge of these things comes through human experience, directly or indirectly, such experience, so far as representative, involves that the knowledge of these is also representa-

tive. Hence all knowledge of physical events, so far as based on inferential construction and on the reports of others, is representative. Since through memory the original experience is partly reinstated and presentatively known, whatever cognitive character the original experience possessed will also be possessed by memory. Of this, knowledge of the self, won by "*innere Anschauung*," is, of course, presentative; knowledge of physical objects is presentative and representative: the former so far as adequate, that is, so far as depending on sensation in which the object is given; the latter, so far as dependent on reproduction. For example, in the perception of a house, the side which I "see" is given in sensation, presented; the sensory elements are identical with the physical being of the house; on the other hand, the back of it, that which I "imagine" or automatically "infer" to exist, is known through reproduced ideas, the material of which was supplied out of other experiences—is known, then, representatively.

So far, we have simply exhibited the dimorphic character of historical knowledge. Now, each form involves manifold difficulties, which must be obviated before we can proceed. We shall begin with the consideration of representative knowledge; for its difficulties, being chiefly epistemological, enter naturally into this connexion, while those of the presentative kind, being mainly metaphysical, will best be considered when we discuss the nature of time.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE AND POSSIBILITY OF REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST

Many doubts have been raised as to the possibility of representative knowledge, and these doubts become more forcible in the case of knowledge of the past.

In the first place, it is objected that one cannot define knowledge as the resemblance between idea and object. Two things that are similar cannot be said to know the one the other. The idea must be used as a representative of the object, and, if so used, the resemblance of the two must itself be known, for only

on the ground of its resemblance could the idea pass for knowledge of the object. But if knowledge of the resemblance is necessary for the definition of knowledge through representation, that knowledge cannot be itself a matter of representation, for if it were, an infinite regress of the illegitimate kind would result.² Thus knowledge cannot occur through representation; for supposed representative knowledge rests on knowledge of another kind. Moreover, in the case of knowledge of the past, representation would be impossible; for if, as is usually supposed, only present ideas exist, one could never, by confronting them with their objects, find out that they resembled each other. How, indeed, could an idea resemble that which is not? How could a term which exists have a relation to one that is non-existent?

Not only must I know resemblance in some way other than through representation, I must know otherwise both my ideas and the objects known, in order to discriminate between the two. How could I discount my ideas in comparison with the reality to which I refer them, unless in some other way I know that reality also? If my knowledge of the reality were itself only a poor idea, I should have to have a second idea—and if this also were only a poor idea, another with which to discount that, and so on *in infinitum*. In other words, how do I ever know that idea is idea and not reality? For by hypothesis, in this case, idea is all that I have.

It is by a subtle error, the objector would urge, that you feel that somehow you can at once know that your idea is not reality and yet know the past through the idea which you disparage. For you actually do, in your thought, begin to carry out that infinite regress referred to above. That is to say, you have an idea, and so long as you do not reflect you take it for a direct experience of the past; but, as soon as you do reflect, you get a new and richer idea which you now take to be a direct experience of reality and in comparison with which you discount your former idea. The unrevised idea you take for reality; but, after climbing a few steps of this ladder, you conclude—and quite rightly from your own point of view—that in no case do you

² Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, p. 84. On the infinite regress, see Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, §§ 55 and 99.

reach the object itself, that all is idea. For of course if no single idea brings you nearer the object, an infinite series will fail.

Against the view that representation could ever give us the ideal of knowledge, even if it did give us partial knowledge, there is urged an objection put in contrary ways by the upholders of two very different theories of truth. On the one hand, it is said that if the truth of an idea be defined as its complete correspondence with its object, when the stage of completeness would have been reached, the idea would be the reality. Complete similarity is identity. The idea known to resemble reality would have become reality known directly. If the truth of an idea is defined as the similarity of idea and object, the definition inevitably destroys the theory which it was meant to express. For, what can adequately represent a thing, except the thing itself? Although our memories are feeble and unreliable spokesmen of our former lives, what voice could tell us their histories except the living voice? And as for our traditions and books, could they ever, however complete and faithful, tell us the truth, unless they were themselves the truth?

From another side,⁸ relying still on the assertion that complete similarity must be identity, it is urged that identity between idea and object can never exist. For not even the content or the general structure of the relations of the idea could ever be exactly similar to those of its object, for however far such similarity might go, the idea, as an event in my life, would be parted in existence from the object as an event in the past, and, as experiences, each would have a peculiar wholeness and individuality which would infect the similarity in content, and so prevent any genuine identity. But if there can be no identity, then knowledge is impossible; or if identity is possible, knowledge is not correspondence, for only things which differ in part can correspond or represent one another.

These objections to representative knowledge rest for the most part upon a misconception of it. The best way to answer them will be to set forth a correct view of the fact. This we

⁸ Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, chap. I.

shall do forthwith, and then briefly consider the objections with special reference to our own problem of the knowledge of the past.

At the very beginning of modern philosophy, the insight was clear that knowledge is an active function exercised by means of ideas. This was recognized by Descartes, and was made into a principle by his greater pupil Spinoza.⁴ Neither perceived any difficulty in the fact that although what is in the mind are ideas, yet something not those ideas can be known through them. However, the power of seeing just how this could be was soon lost even by some of the disciples of the great master, and the result was the artificial and uninspired theory of occasionalism. The precious vision was completely denied to the English school, and through their influence the blindness has descended to the phenomenists and empirio-critics of the present day. Locke's definition of an idea as "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding," became in Berkeley's hands the doctrine that we know only our own ideas. Locke's misapprehension of the theory of innate ideas, Berkeley's and Hume's failure to render an adequate account of universals and of the "immensities and eter-nities," resulted from the same blindness.

Against the view that it is the immediate content of the knowing process which either is known in the cognitive representative act (although of course it may be known by another act) or itself knows merely by being like the object, we assert that there is known an object transcendent to the immediate content, that is, one that is not the content itself, and yet that it is the idea which knows, because not a mere content, but part of the act of a subject. We claim that cognition is a property of ideas, just as translucence is of glass. Under certain conditions ideas have a peculiar property which makes them cognitive: they become objectifying; they carry with them a reference to an object and also an indication of the character of the object. This reference to an object, this sense of another, is part of their very nature. Of their own accord, ideas attribute their characters to

⁴ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part 2, xlivi, schol.; xlix, proof.

another. Thus every idea is a judgment of the form "AB is."⁶ The cognitive experience is essentially, in the first place, an experience of character; thus when I look at the sky I have a "blue experience," and, secondly, it is an experience of this character as belonging, not to itself alone but to another, "an experience of object." The cognitive experience is a declaration: There is an object *such as* I experience. Sometimes, however, there is a declaration of being, without much indication of character. The more adequate the idea, however, the more fully does it reveal the nature of the object, the more nearly similar is it to the latter, until finally, in the case of perfect knowledge, it claims identity with its object. Yet before this last stage is reached one does not need to bring idea and object together, see that they resemble one another, and then use the one as a representation of the other; the idea *uses itself as a representation*. In cognition one becomes aware that there is an object of such and such a character; one does not need to know the idea as idea, for one may be filled with the objectifying experience itself.

Ideas get this power of representing because they are not "lifeless like pictures on a panel," but as living and palpitating as an animated body. And this life they get from ultimate contact with the reality which they know. As we have seen, there is an ingredient of presentation in all representation. In every idea there is, at least, an infinitesimal fragment of what it means. Through this it gets its reference, its intention. This tiny part is the life of the idea; and just as a bit of living matter will assimilate to itself from its environment foreign matter, and out of it construct a complete organism, so this fragment of the object will draw to itself all material within reach and, so far as it can, make itself like that whole from which it came. Then, although not that whole, the idea will mean it; and will *know* it, the more completely it has constructed its image.

How shall we prove that ideas can mean a whole of which they are parts or of which they possess an image? How shall we prove that they have *intent*? Only by exhibiting those cases where the ability of ideas to transcend themselves most strikingly appears, and where, if transcendence, meaning, intent, are

⁶ Compare Brentano, *Psychologie*, Buch II, Capitel 7, 7.

denied, palpable absurdities arise. Accordingly, we shall demonstrate this power in a few telling cases, and then, by leading down to the less obvious ones, show that it obtains in all, even in our simplest every day cognitions.

Consider, first, our ideas of the "immensities and eternities". Take the ideas of infinite space and time. We undoubtedly mean something by these ideas. Moreover, we mean their objects as wholes. When we think of them, we can refer to every detail which they contain. Yet every detail of space or time, every point and every instant, is surely not in the mind. We can, if called upon, declare some of the more universal characters of space and time; we can say that they are order systems, three- and one-dimensional respectively, continuous, and so on. But we do not mean merely what we can enumerate; we mean every single element which only the most thorough investigation of space and time could reveal. It was because Locke, Berkeley, and Hume demanded that what an idea means should be present bodily in the idea, that they denied the being, physical or conceptual, of the infinite.

Consider, next, the idea which is perhaps the most wonderful of all: the idea of the universe. And by this idea we mean the absolute sum-total of everything—the past, the present, the future, and the eternal world. Now, are we to believe that when we refer to the universe it is a part of ourselves, a piece of our minds? It cannot be said that the meaning of the idea is reducible to so much of the world as we have known directly and somehow got in the mind. For of all that we can enumerate in heaven above, in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, we can say, after putting it together—this is not all that we mean. And what we do enumerate is for the most part itself plainly only meant, not in any sense present in the mind; for, with the obvious exception of what lies before me in space or is felt within my skin or remembered, the rest is supplied by imagination of the future and distant. And of memory we are aware, when we reflect, if for no other reason than that it is not vivid and full, that it is not our full meaning itself. Moreover, we can see that this intent of our memory is not reducible to the continual coming in, through association, of ever more ideas,

thereby making each later filling of the idea richer and every earlier one comparatively poorer. Although this does happen, although an idea does give rise to this chain of associated ideas, whereby it becomes more precise and adequate, yet its meaning cannot be reduced either to the chain itself or to the linking of one element of the chain to another. For when the chain is complete it confesses itself as not all that it means, and each link, if questioned apart from the others, would humbly plead that it too was only a poor part and meant something more. Thus even when the idea is part of what it knows, it may through its self-transcending intent know something, the whole, which is not merely itself. Nor does one need to go to the infinite for illustration of the fact of meaning. One can find illustrations among our most common ideas. Consider our ideas of the ocean, of the earth, of the visual form of a book. We *mean* the book as a rectilinear solid, but we have never seen it thus. To be sure, we have put the idea together out of different views, but we mean, not these, but the unitary object, with all its color and sensuous completeness such as would appear if we could, although we cannot, intuit it.

The indispensableness of meaning as an element in the cognitive function is effectively exemplified by the necessity of the use of the little words *all*, *every*, *any*, *a*, *some*, and *the*.⁶ By means of these we are enabled to refer to objects which we have never presentatively known. Thus, by means of the first two we can make reference to a whole class of individuals of which we have never known more than a single instance. We should be unable to do much reasoning if we could not make this reference; for a large part of thinking involves the notion of class, which involves the notion of *all*; without it we should never, in any practical fashion, be able to deal with the group unless we knew each individual member. The concept of *any*, as fundamental in reasoning as that of *all*, since it lies at the basis of the notion of the variable, is perhaps even more significant in this connexion. For by it we can refer, not merely to a whole set of entities in a mass which we do not know individually, but to a single individual in a class which nevertheless we cannot designate as such. To

⁶ See Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, chap. V, "Denoting."

quote Russell, the concept "any term," "does not denote, properly speaking, an assemblage of terms, but denotes one term, only not one particular definite term." To adopt a phrase of the same author, "any man" is an object which, if one could not meet it in the street, one surely could not get into the mind—for one could no more find it in the mind by introspection than one could find it in the street by looking for it.

As for the word "the," the right of the present theory to the use of it would, I suppose, be denied by some of our opponents. For "the" denotes an individual, and they will tell us that we cannot provide for the knowledge of individuals. All ideas are of universal characteristics; so when we know through ideas, we cannot know the individual. But it is a mistake to say that all ideas are of universals. To be sure, by themselves, as mere contents, they define only universals. Yet penetrating their being is the intent "unique member of a class," which we express by the little word "the." This is the tang of the object itself, left by that element of presentation, however minute, which, as we know, inheres in all ideas. Such, we believe, is a correct view of the nature of representative knowledge. We are now in a position to reply to the objections which evoked the discussion. To what extent does the theory that ideas have intent remove these objections?

We admit that representative knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge, and even that it involves, remotely, presentative knowledge. But this does not impugn its relatively independent character. It constitutes, moreover, by far the most extensive part of our knowledge. Almost all knowledge of the past is of this variety.

We admit that one cannot know an object through the mere possession of a similar idea. The idea must have a cognitive function, must be endowed with the life of intention. But when thus endowed, our theory escapes the charge of circularity which can be brought against the crude form of representative theory. One does not know an object because one *knows* that one possesses an idea which resembles that object. Neither the idea nor the resemblance between the idea and the object need be known; the resembling idea *knows*. Of course all these elements can, in turn,

be known by another experience, but this knowledge of the knowing does not enter into the definition of knowing.

We have already dealt with the general objection against our view, to the effect that unless we could "get outside of our ideas" we could never discriminate between an idea and an object. Consider, however, the case of the past. When I think of, say, the death of Spinoza, unless I reflect, the thought never arises that my idea is only a picture. In knowing, I am knowing; I am not reflecting on the problem of knowledge. Yet when I do reflect, I awake to the fact that it was only indirect knowledge that I was engaged in, not direct witnessing of the event. And I do this among other reasons for the one suggested, namely, because I compared this idea with a new and richer one.⁷ And this process can indeed be carried on indefinitely. Every inadequate idea can be discredited by a new and richer idea. And further, it is true, as was said, that never by this infinite process of ideation can I get the past itself as it existed. But although we admit the process and the failure, we deny that the failure is a failure in knowledge. For, although we nowhere get nearer to the existence of the past, we get ever nearer to a more adequate knowledge of it. Even the first idea knew, and the revised idea knew better.

Finally, the objection that if our ideas were ideally complete they would be the past and therefore could not represent it, is true, but harmless. It is true that the most complete idea contains its object. Now, in the case of the past, this can never be; for the whole past, as we shall prove in our next chapter, cannot recur. Yet because complete knowledge is impossible, partial knowledge is not therefore impossible. Through representation we have such knowledge, and genuine knowledge.

As for the objection of Joachim, to the effect that idea and object cannot be alike, because, in the case of knowledge of the past, they belong to different moments of time, have different relations, and so must be different, it plainly rests on the so-called internal view of relations. The answer to it consists in the assertion of the opposed view. That relations may be external, I take to have been proved by Russell, in his work *The Principles of*

⁷ See page 111.

Mathematics, chapter xxvii, ¶ 428 and ¶ 49. However this be, it is a fact of experience that there can be similar objects in different settings, that is, with different relations. One hesitates to point to the two leaves of a tree or to picture and original. I cannot see how logic can gainsay such experiences. But only a mistaken logic undertakes this. Even if objects in different relations cannot be identical, the representative theory is untouched; for all that it demands is similarity; it does not demand complete identity.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF TIME

Thus far we have investigated the knowledge of the past wholly from the side of the knowing. We have reached our conclusions quite independently of any assumptions as to the being and nature of the object of knowing. Now that we have outlined our own theory of knowledge of the past from the side of the idea, if we would complete that view we can no longer avoid justifying our assumptions explicitly by determining the precise nature and being of the past. Briefly put, our view has been that we know the past through ideas in which are present characters like those of the object, which characters are announced by the idea itself as belonging to the object. The characters are immediately, instinctively, and automatically referred to an object, in the knowing act; the object thus appears either partly in person, in memory, or vicariously, in idea; this appearance is the direct knowledge of the object. Knowledge is the more complete the more fully the characters of the object appear in the idea. We have already examined some of the difficulties which such an account of knowledge has to face, both in general and with regard to the past. There are others still unsolved. If the memory experience be partly identical with the original, the problem arises as to how one thing can exist at two times. Further, does a past event exist before it is remembered? If so, what sort of existence did it possess? If not, how can a thing which has once ceased to exist, return into existence? Again,

suppose the past does not exist, how can any view make knowledge of the non-existent intelligible, and in particular how can a view do so which regards knowledge as adequate so far as idea and object are similar? How can a thing which exists be similar to another which does not exist? On the other hand, if for the purposes of knowledge we must suppose that the past exists, how is it truly past? The answer to these questions requires an investigation of the whole problem of time.

1. THE TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE

As we now possess it, time is a very complex concept, developed in the service of multifarious interests, and involving the metaphysical assumptions of common-sense philosophy. In the light of this, we feel, with Professor Royce,⁸ that "much of the difficulty that appears in our metaphysical views about time is due . . . to lack of naïveté and directness in viewing the temporal aspects of reality," and that in order to get clear and fresh conceptions we must go to the source whence all have flowed, the immediate time-experience itself.

The fundamental aspect of the temporal experience is that of change, the experience of the influx of elements around a core relatively stable, and of their disintegration. In relation to one another they constitute the so-called time-form. What are the obvious characters of the time-form, as illustrated by the familiar examples of the melody, the line of verse when uttered, the beats of a metronome? Plainly, serial order and irreversible sense: several elements present together in an arrangement of one after the other, with univocal direction. But these traits do not serve to distinguish time-form from other forms. The words which constitute the verse have a serial order, and taken together with their meaning have an irreversible direction. The distinguishing element in question is that of change. Just to see the words on a page is to have an experience in itself wholly non-temporal, which, if it were to last, would be an experience of eternity. But as soon as we repeat the line the experience is transformed, it is now one of change, that is, of coming and of passing away, of

⁸ *The World and the Individual*, 2nd series, lecture III.

novelty which becomes familiarity. The static meaning has become agitated and has altered its posture; if we wish a static picture of a dynamic thing, we may liken it to a directed line of dots which, till now horizontal, has tipped slightly, up or down. The elements have the same order and direction, only the forward and the rearward ones have somehow been displaced; they have been marked, the former with the brand "new," the latter with the brand "familiar" or "departing."

It is this element of change which differentiates time-form from all others, making it unique and irreducible. Novelty and passing do not belong to the static and eternal form of series. In the eternal there is, to be sure, variety and unity, but there is not novelty and losing. There, each has a distinct and unique place; but all places are filled; there is no passing of one and rise of other. Here, elements are felt as entering into places left vacant by others, the newcomers crowding out the old. In the eternal and static, all things are known; in time, acquaintance grows: a stranger enters; he departs a familiar friend.

The direction of the time-experience is determined by the experience of novelty passing into familiarity, and then into loss. The new comes before the old, the old before the decaying. The new must always enter from one direction, and the old pass out in the other.

The time-experience is not primarily volitional, but cognitive. It is most striking when the self passively endures the influx of new unsought sensations. Our deeds are temporal because they are creative and depend on change; our will looks forward because it grasps at something new.

At the lowest level, the distinctions of past, present, and future do not exist in full development. Yet there are the beginnings of them. An element, as it goes, leaves the memory of itself, the old element in an altered form. This is felt as past because it has at once two characters, familiarity and loss. It is familiar because it once was completely ours, and is now partially so. The past was once present, and memory is an outgrowth of something always with us. In the background of consciousness elements of the past exist, and all remembering is a completion of them. Memory is marked with the sense of loss because it comes to us

as part of a whole which we cannot possess, yet which once was ours. Here again the fact of meaning is presupposed. Through the elements of memory we look to more, of which they are parts, but not the whole. Past, then, are those elements of the process of change which, grafting themselves on to the permanent, belong to a whole, once ours, but incapable of reinstatement.

Certain views of the nature of pastness are inaccurate. Pastness does not arise out of the felt contrast between memory and vivid experience; for the same contrast exists in the case of expectation. Nor does it come through desire, the straining after something and finding that we cannot get it; for we seek in the future and cannot get. Moreover, the past cannot adequately be described as that which, in contrast with the future, we cannot alter; for the inevitable is also unalterable.

Future elements are felt as new. They cannot, as individuals, be immediately assimilated to the old. Only through the concept, or only so far as the intent of an expectation, are they old, and even so they stand out contrasted with that which means them. Here again, a volitional interpretation is insufficient. We cannot define the future as the object of action, as that which we can create or alter, as that which we seek and can get; for much comes unasked and inevitably. An object is not primarily future because we strive for it, but because it is a possible new experience. It is future, merely if we represent it as not wholly ours.

Past and future are not absolutely distinct. As we saw, future objects are not wholly unfamiliar. So far as expected, or so far as a concept fits the new individual experience, it was already there. Experience is a unity, and the universal is in the particular. The so-called future grows out of the past, and contains, in new forms, many of its elements. Only the wholly new elements can be called absolutely future. Yet they come wrapt up in the old, and forthwith become old.

The full development of the distinctions between past, present, and future requires reflection. The felt continuity of our life must be splintered into three disjointed parts. Objects must be reflected upon, and the memory or expectation not be confused as present experiences with their objects. Once more we come upon the fact of meaning. The memory which is ours and present

means something more which is no longer ours and is past; the expectation, also present, means an individual experience, not yet possessed, which is future. Only thus can arise the negativity, the contrast, the holding of one thing over against another, necessary for the experience when full grown. This experience in its fullness involves the thought, first, of a limited range of existence, the present, and, secondly, of another field which does not belong to the first, yet which once did belong to it, the past and future. In contrast with an eternal realm like that of mathematics, where an element, if it belongs in a class, always belongs there, elements are here thought of as excluded from a class to which they once belonged or to which they may later be added. The consciousness of time implies the awareness of a limitation of being which cannot be overcome by knowledge. But the experience of pastness is not simply the experience of a genuine limitation in being. It is not sufficiently describable as the awareness that now is not then, that this is not that. For it is also the experience of loss, and loss is more than limitation. This feature, being one of the unique characters of this experience, can be expressed only in terms of itself. It is the feeling that to us belonged something which we have no longer.

If our account be correct, it is clear that any attempt to find in the time-form every feature of the time-experience, and, by applying a generalized type of this to the hypothetical absolute, to make conceivable a retention of the actual time-distinctions of our finitude within an all-embracing experience, is futile. The distinctions of past and present are not completely contained in the elements which belong to the specious present. In the time-form we have, to be sure, earlier and later, coming and going. One element does not occupy the same place as another in the time-sequence, and one is more forward or more backward in the time-direction. But there is no *gone*, no *lost*. When I hear a line of verse, the first words are not "over and done with" at the time when the later ones arrive. They are simply behind and *fading*, but not *faded*; *passing*, but not *past*. We experience pastness completely when we reflectively experience *loss*. Awareness of difference of position and of vividness within the specious present, or even of a change of these, does not suffice for this experience.

The elements must be felt as absent from the specious present, as excluded from all that we immediately experience. The felt exclusiveness of past and present is hence not at all comparable to that of one point on a line with reference to another. There one point is simply not another, but both belong to the same universe of discourse. In the temporal experience, on the other hand, the two elements exclude each other from the same universe. The one is felt to have a character which the other has lost, and which absolutely differentiates them. They belong to two different realms. In vain does one endeavor to reconcile the incompleteness, striving, and pursuit which are admittedly characteristic of the temporal experience, with the completeness, attainment, and repose attributed to the absolute consciousness.

2. THE SCOPE OF TIME

Thus far we have discovered time within experience only, in the coming in and disintegration of its elements. But nature lies within experience, the growth and decay of conscious elements is also a growth and decay of natural elements. I watch the burning of a candle—the wax melts and, running down, accumulates on the mouth of the receptacle. Here are all the features of change—the coming to be of new and the passing away of old characters around a central persistence, the general candle form. Or through years I watch an organism. I perceive growth and correlated therewith always decay, yet, despite both, identity and continuity. Is this apparently temporal character an illusion?

The belief that the temporal character of natural objects is an illusion, or, in other words, that time is subjective, is based on the obvious fact that we never find anything in nature unless we also, in some sense, find it in ourselves. All nature, we know, must, in a way, pass through the self. Perhaps in so passing it takes on, to our view, characters, among which are the temporal, which do not properly belong to it.

However, the fact that in knowing objects we know them does not prove that the characters we find in them are subjective only. For, as we have seen, it is of the nature of the idea, either through

containing part of the object itself or through a copy of it, to announce its own characters as being literally and objectively those of the object. Nevertheless, no epistemological theory would maintain that every feature of the knowing state, as psychical fact, belongs to the object which appears through it. We have always to inquire, how much of the idea is declared by it to belong to the object, how much is merely its own. Every epistemological investigation involves the separation of the objective from the subjective. The question is, What temporal characters do we actually observe in nature?

In the arising and disappearing of elements we have so far discovered the essence of time. And this, as we have seen, in nature we seem clearly to observe. Yet, so the Kantian would object, what we always find both in ourselves and in what you call "nature" is a coming of such elements into consciousness and their gradual fading away out of it; the coming and going of visual sensations into and out of the field of consciousness really constitutes what you take to be time in the candle. The objection rests upon a misunderstanding. Only figuratively should one think of the elements as coming and going "in consciousness." Consciousness is nothing besides them. It is no room or receptacle which contains them. Like space, it is simply a whole which they form. Now, elements may either pass from that whole, as when I turn my face from the candle, and so have no reason, as I can recover them, to think they have vanished; or else they may decay in that whole, as when, in my sight, the candle burns down and the light goes out. In the latter case, the elements are irrecoverable, and have vanished not merely from consciousness, but *from existence*.

There is a difference between passing from the self and disintegrating within the self. Growth and disintegration are the differentiae of time; not entering and leaving the self. And this growth and disintegration we observe in nature. The elements which arise in nature may also arise into the self, and their decay may be a decay in both. Not coming and going in consciousness, but coming and going at all, make up the essence of time.

Yet not everything which we associate with time belongs to nature apart from consciousness. In nature there is no memory

or expectation. The memory which Hering supposed to be a universal property of living matter is not really this. Habit and heredity produce another like the old, they do not preserve the old. Or, if they preserve the old, it is that which is universal in the old, not the individual. Memory alone preserves what is individual in the past. For in memory alone, through a part that remains, is meant the individual whole which, by being meant, is so far conserved.

Likewise, in nature there is no foresight or expectation. Again what seems to be this is not really such. The blackberry bush will put forth its thorns just the same when sheltered in the cultivated garden. Nature cannot foresee any specific event. Nature's foresight is habit or a vague foreboding. It is the privilege of consciousness to predict.

Since nature has no memory or expectation, the Bergsonian thesis that she has no duration is sustained. What in nature corresponds to the sense of duration is, as we shall see, correlation. The sense of duration is a purely psychical complex made up of memories, expectations, and comparisons. A full discussion and test of this we reserve for another place. Yet this truth does not involve the non-temporal character of nature. Not duration, but growth and decay, are the real temporal facts, and these, as we have seen, are facts of nature.

Time, then, belongs to nature and to consciousness; but it does not belong to all that is. All ideal and universal objects, all mathematical and logical entities, are eternal and non-temporal. For they do not arise and perish, they are not subject to change. To be sure, our knowledge of them begins at a certain date, grows, or fades away. What we think of them changes as we change. Our knowledge of the number system has altered since the Pythagoreans, and doubtless Cantor and Russell and Dedekind have not taught us all that we are yet to learn. Yet the number series does not change, and its elements, although ordered in a way somewhat similar to the moments of time, are not temporally one before the other. Only our consciousness of it is temporal; as when, for example, we count, becoming aware first of *one*, then of *two*, and so on, each element being past when the next is present. No analysis of the numbers themselves would

yield any hint of change, or of the distinctions of past, present, or future. To be sure, they might all be present at a given date to the knowledge of a being with a sufficiently wide span of attention. But this would not make them in themselves present or give them any time relations, since they might also be present to an earlier or later state of consciousness. The like is true of all conceptual objects. But to this subject we shall return at the end of this monograph.

3. THE PROPERTIES OF TIME

So far we have considered time chiefly as a character of the immediately known inner life. But, as we have already seen, time is not merely subjective. It is a category of nature as well. We have yet to determine the universal properties of time, and especially those of that portion which particularly concerns us—the past.

That time is a series is clear from the fact of change. Consider again the burning of a candle. One given length exists, then another, then another. There is a disappearance or an influx of elements, one after the other. The process of change occurs in stages, each whole situation constituting an instant, serialized by a transitive, asymmetrical relation. The process, we have stated, is constituted by the influx or efflux of elements—but of what is it a process? *What changes?* Whatever remains identical throughout various stages is the thing which changes. We speak of a changing candle because there is a visible identity in the phenomenon. In general, a “thing” changes when elements are added to or subtracted from a stable part. The self is an example. The instants of a man’s biography are successive psychical wholes. His identity, that which makes it possible to speak of “him” at all, is the mass of organic sensations, feelings, and purposes, which focally or marginally are with him always. He grows with the increment of experiences and decays with their disintegration. The union of identity with diversity in change is, at least in the case of the self, an experiential fact.

In characterizing growth as an “addition,” and decay as a “subtraction,” I do not mean to imply any particular view of

the kind of whole which a thing or a self forms, least of all that it is a mere "sum of parts." The whole in question may have any organization you please. Whatsoever its structure, and whatever its mode of assimilation, something will be added to it in growth, and something taken from it in decay. This is the most general description of the process.

Bradley's well-known view, that change is a contradictory concept because identity and diversity cannot be united, has been refuted, we believe, by Russell. Bradley's argument, briefly stated, is this. Let a given cross-section of the change-process of anything be a . Let a remain identical while b is added. Then that stage will be $a + b$. a , we say, has changed into $a + b$. But what is a that has remained identical? b cannot be simply juxtaposed. Its adjunction must have effected some alteration in a . Let us then rewrite a as $a + \beta$, a being that part which has remained identical, β being that novel part introduced into a by the change. But clearly, the same reasoning applies to a in relation to β . Hence we must find a new expression for a ,—and so on without end.

Bradley has here given us, I think, a true description of our procedure in the conceptual dealing with pervasive change. Growth is no mere accretion from the outside. Change is continuous, and often centripetal into the very core. All parts may be affected, even the most minute. We may not be able to observe the change, yet it probably exists. Nevertheless—herein is contained the answer to Bradley—identity as well as difference is omnipresent here. Distinguish forever in the fashion illustrated, yet you will always find identity. You can no more get rid of it than you can reach the end of an infinite series. It is a fact that will pursue you. Of course, empirically, you will be unable longer to find diversity; at last the identity will seem to be pure. Pure or not, it will always be there. And the infinite progress, although practically inconvenient, is logically harmless.

Time, then, is a series. What are its properties? (1) In the first place, the series is simple. If one takes one's stand upon the individual consciousness, this is obvious. Its simplicity is that of our unified inner life. Change is here incident to a single whole. But time is no mere individual affair, relative

to each biography. There are many temporal processes, but only one time. Time is the series which results from their correlation, and this series is simple. What is the principle of the correlation?

The principle is this—those stages of different processes are contemporaneous which exist, or existed, together. To ask what events are contemporaneous with a given existing event is to ask, what other events exist? The time order of events which are under direct observation is set up very simply. Those which we observe to exist constitute a “now,” or moment. Coexistence is observable just as the collineation of points on a line. One can observe, for example, the coexistence of various bodily sensations. These events pass away. This is also a matter of observation. Other events coexist, displacing these, which are perhaps remembered. The relation of before and after is then plainly established.

The co-presence and the succession of events are thus matters of observation. Memory, apart from error, will of course reflect this. When events cannot be observed and remembered, their co-presence and succession have to be established by analogy and induction. Only thus, for example, can the time relations of geological strata or organic fossils be discovered. Here we reason on the basis of coexistences and sequences directly observable.

Time is nothing apart from processes. Time is simply the abstract for their correlation and ordering. The elements of individual series are levelled with others through coexistence; the order in which they exist or do not exist, their order in arising and perishing, is their time order.

Russell⁹ has objected to all so-called relativistic views of time on the ground that since events form a many-one series—many events being co-present at a single time—they cannot be independent of each other and merely correlated, but must derive their order from the order of an objective and absolute time, a sequence not deducible from them. Co-presence, from this point of view, means co-presence at a given time, and so implies the independent existence of time. Events are correlated by relation to time—time is not the abstract for their correlation.

⁹ “Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relative?” *Mind*, July, 1901.

There is both truth and error in this view. It is wrong in supposing that co-presence implies time. As we have seen, co-existence is primary, "co-presence at a given time" presupposes that the order of coexistences has already been established. A given moment is nothing but a level of events. Events are co-present simply because they coexist or have coexisted. The moment "at which" is determinable solely with reference to other levels of coexistence, either as preceding or succeeding. Yet Russell is right in insisting that time is not merely a matter of point of view. Processes are not independent of each other, for the principle of their correlation cannot be deduced from any single one. They are levelled through the possession of a common character, coexistence, and serialized through objective relations of succession. Even to possess a common character is to be mutually related, and to be related is to be subject to an objective law independent of the point of view of each. Hence time is not merely the "form of the inner sense," but an objective series of levels of inner senses. The levels are the instants or moments of time. Events or wholes, stages in individual processes, are levelled with others through the relation of coexistence; they form a single series of levels because the levels are one before another in a determinate order.

No difficulty is incurred by this view of time as a series of levels of coexistent phases of experience, from the fact of differences in their so-called rates of change. In order to be convinced of this, one must apprehend the status of duration as a character of objective time. I have already asserted that in nature there is no sense of duration. This is, in fact, wholly subjective. It depends on attention, interest, expectation, etc. It is a feeling which accompanies the existence of elements in consciousness in relation to other elements. Objectively, it is wholly a matter of correlation. An element endures or lasts long when it is coexistent with the emergence and passage of many other elements. One process is slower than another when to a few stages of the former there are correlated many of the latter. For example, to say that the sun takes twelve times as long to complete its orbit as the moon does hers, is simply to define a correlation between twelve series of positions defined by the revo-

lutions of the moon and one series of positions defined by the revolution of the sun. As Mach has suggested, to say that a process "takes time," as, for instance, the cooling of a body does, is to say that a series of heat values is dependent functionally on other such series in surrounding bodies and, indirectly, on the position of the sun, and, in fact, on every other series of events in the universe. To have to wait for an event, to say of it that a certain length of time will elapse before it appears, means that certain other phenomena will inevitably intervene to consciousness. Objectively, time is just the order of the correlation of facts.

It would be a misapprehension of the view here defended to suppose that it assumed the independence of processes. There is only one process, just as there is only one time. The one existence-stream wells up inside the relatively isolated centers of experience, and may be artificially divided into many distinct natural eddies. Yet, in truth, nature and consciousness overlap, and all nature is one flux. From changes in one apparently isolated series can be determined changes in another. The so-called spatial distance of one from another is usually a condition of lateness in such dependent changes, that is, it involves that if *b* in center *n* depend on *a* in center *m* a whole series of other changes will precede in *n* and *m*. Hence, since nature is a whole and there are no independent processes, one might, as Mach has shown, replace *t* in physical equations by the path of the sun, or by any other continuous and parallel process, provided one could discover the law of the concomitant variations. And, of course, this is what, for all practical purposes, is done. The *t* of physical equations, like all other expressions for so-called absolute time, is just a symbol for the correlation of events, usually with the sun. For the proof of this, one has only to refer to the works of Mach, Ostwald, Poincaré, and Stallo.

If our view of time be correct, Bradley's supposition that there might be many time series is futile. His appeal to the varieties of personal experience, we have already disposed of. Even if there were experiences entirely remote from ours, they would belong to the same time. For they would either exist or not exist; their comings and goings would necessarily align them

with ours. Since existence and non-existence are distinctions absolute, all-pervasive, and single, so, as time is based on these distinctions, time itself is absolute, all pervasive, and single. Of any remote experience we should only need to ask, does it exist, and it would thereby be levelled with whatever experience of ours existed. Appeal to the apparent manifoldness of the time of fiction is irrelevant. Real time can be predicted only of what exists or has existed.

(2) In our own experience, time is sensibly continuous.¹⁰ Even the phenomena of sleep and swooning are only apparent exceptions. For our immediate experience, these are changes, not lapses, in consciousness. Introspection has no means of answering Locke's question, whether the soul always thinks. Left to itself in its backward search, it can find only experiences succeeding one another. One could not experience a lapse in consciousness; for to do so would require that one should experience one's own non-existence—the very conception of which is contradictory. One could not *find* a lapse by mere memory, for to do so would require that one should find emptiness; now to find emptiness presupposes that one is already aware of the being of something that has boundaries between which there might be a filling; but aside from sophistication gained elsewhere, consciousness is unaware of boundaries in the stream of its own life. We come to believe in gaps, first, from the reports of our fellow men who tell us that time was, that is, that their own life was awake and moving, while we were still and asleep. Through correlating individual streams of consciousness we see that to elements of one there correspond no elements of others. The observation that recurrent physical processes have seemingly skipped those intermediaries which we expect normally to occur, confirms our belief. We prefer to regard our own lives as discontinuous rather than nature's, because we have learned to think of her as having an existence and habit independent, and superior to our own. Thus even if there are gaps in the individual experience—empty spaces in the lives of each—time is not thereby rendered discontinuous. For if, correlated with these, there exists any experience of other

¹⁰ See Ostwald, *Naturphilosophie*, Fünfte Vorlesung, on which our account is largely dependent.

men or of nature which is continuous, time is continuous also; for time is just the order of whatever experiences there happen to have been. Hence there can be time between phases of individual experience, but "no time between time." Even if the universe were to fall asleep and then waken, there would be no lapse of time: for there is no time where there is no existence; the waking would follow immediately on the sleep; it would be merely another experience, contiguous with the world's last dream.

Within our individual conscious experience itself there are no reasons for regarding time as continuous in the mathematical sense. We certainly cannot discover by introspection an infinity of elements. And such an infinity would not make completely intelligible what we mean by the felt continuity of consciousness. Time, in the inner life, is continuous as sensible space is. Our conviction that it is continuous in the mathematical sense is due to our measurement of it by physical processes. We assume that physical processes are mathematically continuous, because we assume that space over which motion proceeds is continuous. But no one, of course, has ever observed continuity either in space or in motion. The assumption of continuity helps us to predict; it works well in our science, hence our belief. The sensible continuity of time involves at least connexity, absence of breaks; that is, that between any two parts of the series, if there is anything, it is always part of the series, and, further, that no discrete elements can be found. Those who regard time as discontinuous are idealists who base their conviction on the discontinuity of the pulses of attention. But they neglect the entire sphere of inattention. When this is taken into view, consciousness has the continuity described—it has no breaks, and, during waking at least, "fills" time.

In the subtle little book, *Les données immédiates de la conscience*, the serial view of time has received an acute critique at the hands of Bergson. The argument is, we think, fatal to any conception of time as a punctual series, in which any element which occupies a given position is necessarily excluded from every other. What Bergson has called *la pénétration mutuelle des éléments*, the existence of elements in both past and present, is,

as we have seen, an indubitable fact of memory, and quite irreconcilable with the punctual image. Yet, because time is not a punctual series, it is not therefore no series at all. There can be no question as to the being of stages in all change, stages which do form a series of some kind. Consider only the growth of an organism, motion, our familiar burning candle, the flight of a man's thoughts. The stages here are not mere conceptual sections in a homogeneous unit; they are real; that is, they correspond to something actual—the successive emergence and decay of elements. Justice is not done to this aspect of time in Bergson's treatment. Yet it is quite as fundamental as that upon which he insists—the conservation of the past. Both aspects are essential to a complete view.

There are other illustrations of series besides that of the points on a line. There is a very simple spatial one, which illustrates many features of the time series. Consider a series of overlapping areas of various sizes. Here parts of space exist identically in various areas. Yet the latter may be arranged in a continuous series. Each position, that is, each whole area, is unique, but the parts of areas are not all so; some will run through the entire series. The positions will be distinguished by possessing or not possessing elements which do not or do belong to the others. The properties of time are parallel. The "events" are unique, that is, the whole stages or cross-sections of a process. But the elements of these are not unique, they are repeated in various wholes, exist at various "times." The wholes are always different, but the elements may not be unique. Take the self as an illustration. It begins its career as a definite whole of elements. Growth consists in the continual modification of this through the loss of some elements and the gain of others. Self-identity may be more or less. After maturity, for example, it is probably greater than before and after puberty; yet there is always some of it. Thus the organic sensations are largely identical "over-night," and the thoughts of the morrow may be the same as those of yesterday.

Similar facts are patent when we consider not only the individual but the social temporal process. It is the totality of the material assimilated by each generation which is different. Yet

the social heritage is an accumulation—there is a fund of identity around which accretions form. But the whole is not conserved. Each invention by displacing other things, either in use or interest, destroys something. The temporal process is conservative, constructive, and destructive.

Our conception of time removes a difficulty involved in our epistemology. The problem was, If memory and, to a certain extent, report actually present us with the past, how can that which they present exist at two times? Our view shows how we can "get the past over again," not, to be sure, the complete past, but part of it. It shows that present and past are not wholly incompatible. Hence, even if ideally adequate knowledge involving reinstatement of its total object be here impossible, knowledge is still possible.

Here is a striking illustration of the interdependence of ontology and epistemology. The conception of time as a linear spatial series plainly involves a purely representative theory of knowledge of the past. Each mental state must be unique and hence can know only through being similar to the past. This is the view of time accepted by the ordinary scientific psychology. We now know that it is not at all inevitable and that it is contradicted by the facts of self-identity and memory.

It would be objected to our view, that an element cannot exist at two times, for in order to do so it would have to maintain its identity despite its entrance into new relationships. And, so it is claimed, a thing cannot be identical in a new context. This objection rests upon the view of relations as internal. We have already replied to it. Partial identity despite change of relationships is a *fact* of immediate experience. I am partly the same as man and as child, before and after entering into civic relationships. We repeat, no logic can invalidate the truth of such experiences. For a logical defense of the external view of relations and critique of the internal, I must again refer to Russell.

(3) That time has direction, is deducible from the universal character of conscious experience, whose form it is. We have already laid stress on the appreciable aspects of this: the sense of novelty, of the breaking in of new contents upon the self and the passing of the old, of the direction of the will, which estab-



lishes the teleological order. To those who believe in the eternal existence of the whole of time, time-sense is, of course, wholly of an appreciable and subjective character. But to those who believe that only a single present exists, the time-direction is an irreducible character of the irreducible fact of becoming. It rests on the asymmetry of the relations before and after of becoming. The fact of coming into existence and passing out of existence in an order is the fact of time-direction.

(4) The most impressive, emotionally, of all the characters of time, is perhaps that of its lack of double points. No moment is at once past and future to any other. Each divides the others into two mutually exclusive classes, the past and the future. Time does not at any point turn back on its course. Time is irreversible, the past is irrevocable. In memory we may call back some of the past, but the complete past returns not again. Hence the sadness of the time process.

Mach and Ostwald derive our belief in the irreversibility of time from such processes as wearing out, decay, growing old, the dissipation of heat, and so on. There are no truly reversible or recurrent processes in nature. Cyclical processes and so-called recurrent processes are only apparently such. The coexistence of the unlike phases of other such processes and of irreversible processes renders these processes also, because of the unity of nature, really non-recurrent. But our belief is, I think, more deeply and inwardly grounded. Time order, we have seen, is identical with the order of co-present experiences. And it is from the law of our inner life that we feel assured that the past cannot wholly recur. For the past to become our future we should have to be boys again, we with our sophistication and sober purposes should have to be innocent and playful. And this, of course, could not be. We might know the past boy that we were, just as we know another boy now, but we could not *be* that boy, any more than we can be this boy. For to be a boy depends on having just those limitations which would be destroyed if our being should flow together with his. Knowledge and ignorance cannot coexist. One cannot be exactly what one is and something else besides.

The continuity of the change-process and the identity of the self through change thus prevent any sudden recurrence of the past. But might not the reinstatement of the past be gradual? Only an immediate following of the past moment upon a present one is rendered impossible through continuity. Suppose the lost elements gradually to be replaced and the new ones as gradually to fall away, might not, after sufficient time, the old actually recur, not in my life or yours, but in that of our children? Might not various areas of our illustration be repeated, not once only, but often, in the course of time's infinity? Like the arts, civilizations might be lost and found many times. The ancient myths of the cyclical course of the world, of transmigration and reincarnation, would be confirmed. There would be a sort of universal alternation of generations. The same rôles in the drama of the world would be impersonated many times by different actors. Why is the familiar image of time a straight line rather than a cubic?

Apart from any *a priori* ground for the belief in the uniqueness of the moments or stages of the time-process, our conviction of it rests on a generalization supported by the entire range of our experience. The actual laws of the world speak universally in its favor. Nowhere, in either space or time, do we meet with the exact similarity of any demonstrable whole. Parts of a whole will be found alike, but invariably others will differ. Owing to the well-grounded inference of the interaction of all existents, in order for any considerable part of a contemporaneous world to be exactly like any part of a preceding epoch, two entire cross-sections of time would have to be alike. The improbability of this is enormous.

Yet, besides these empirical grounds, there is an *a priori* one for the uniqueness of moments. By an *a priori* ground I mean one based upon the nature of experience as such. Experience is living, organic; its changes are pervasive and cumulative; and although it may decline, and fall back to the general character of a preceding stage, the new stage will nevertheless bear traces of the intervening development which will differentiate it from the earlier similar one. A difference in position in the temporal

series necessitates a difference in character, just because each over-lies the whole range of the preceding. To suppose that two moments are exactly alike except for position, involves a contradiction; for their character depends on their position.

The impossibility of the retention of the complete past in the present, or the recurrence of any past moment as a new future, prevents in any metaphysically sympathetic heart full feeling for the optimism of progress. We can progress only through destroying. The new is perhaps better than the old. Still the old was good and its pure and integral value is irrevocably lost.

(5) Last, we have a deep-seated conviction that the past had no beginning, and that the future will have no end. The universality of this belief is rather weakened by the prevalence of creation stories. Yet it seems doubtful if any beginning of time was thought of by these myth-makers. After all, the gods or chaos existed previously.

Philosophers have attempted to disprove the possibility of a first moment of time. To suppose a first moment, it is said, is to suppose a time when time was not. Yet this argument is obviously sophistical, for it really presupposes the infinity of time, which is the point in dispute. The hypothesis was not that of a beginning of time in time, but of a beginning of time at all. By the hypothesis there was nothing before the first moment; indeed, it is illegitimate to speak of before at all except after the first moment. This reasoning becomes more cogent if we bear in mind that apart from events in time, that is, apart from experience, there is no time. Individual subjective time certainly has a beginning at or near conception, and an end at death.

The arguments against an infinite past are equally fallacious. The chief of these is Kant's, contained in the First Antinomy. To suppose an infinite past is to suppose that at each moment an infinite time had elapsed; but this would mean that an infinite series had been completed. "But the infinity of a series consists in this, that it can never be completed by a successive synthesis." Lotze has given a correct answer to this argument: "It is not with itself that the endlessness of time is in contradiction, but only with our effort to include its infinite

progress in a finite one of the same kind."¹¹ We, to be sure, cannot count an infinite series, we cannot embrace the whole in any successive synthesis, but this does not prove that an infinite does not exist. And there is nothing contradictory in supposing that at each moment an infinite series has preceded. The possibility of a series with a last but no first member is demonstrated by the example of the series of negative whole numbers.

Ex nihilo nihil fit is the ancient and sufficient reason against the supposition of a first moment. We know of no origination which is not an outgrowth, the coming to be of which was determined by an existent. It was thus that our own experience was born, it is thus that natural products are made. For a similar reason, the universe can have no end. The disintegration of an existent is ultimately due to the onslaught of another, it is a sequence of conflict, out of which one element always rises a victor. Destruction is relative to growth or persistence. We have only to think of the death of the organism, undoubtedly due to the attack of exterior forces which feed on its destruction. It is unthinkable that any simple element should, in itself, perish. A whole can perish only through the conflict of its own elements or a conflict with external forces. But in each case some elements are rendered more stable in existence: in the former, certain of its own; in the latter, part of its environment. The inner decay of the simple and the harmonious is impossible. Suicide is no exception. Hence the universe can never come to an end. For of external enemies there are none, and inner disruption of some of its parts is relative to the growth of the rest. Since existence has been always, time also has been always, and since existence shall be always, so shall time.

¹¹ Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Bosanquet's translation, p. 245, octavo edition.

CHAPTER IV

THE METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF THE PAST

In our account of time we have assumed the common-sense view that only the "present" exists. For that view, time is not an existent whole. Only a part exists. The distinction between past and present is both relative and absolute: relative, since from the point of view of one moment all preceding moments are past; absolute, since one and only one of such points of view exists, or is present in the pregnant sense of the term.

Metaphysics cannot take the non-existence of the past for granted. Perhaps the belief of common-sense is a prejudice. May not the distinction between past and present be purely relative? In other words, may not the present, or "now," be a logical variable, applicable to any moment and so to all moments, rather than to one only, and that a changing one? We have tacitly assumed that becoming and disintegration are ultimate facts; perhaps they are illusions, perhaps the universe is timelessly or time-inclusively actual.

In recent times the view of common-sense has been impugned as a piece of popular and false metaphysics, and the whole time series regarded as actual. The distinction between past and future is wholly relative, it is declared. From the point of view of each moment the others are either past or future, but no one point of view is truer than another. The experiences of passing away and of becoming are illusions. The past and future are inaccessible, not non-existent. When I say, my past is gone, my old self is dead, I really mean, I am not that self, that self is another self. In fact, "all that is past, all histories, actions, and states of our earlier time" are, not to be sure *now*, but *then*, "still existing and happening," "and every individual being S_n has alongside of itself as many doubles, S_1, S_2, S_3 , completing themselves one after another, as it counts various moments in the existence which it seems to have lived through,"¹² and, so we

¹² Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Bosanquet's translation, p. 258.

ought to add, as many other such doubles as it shall live through, to and including the one that dies. Thus there is no real loss or gain in the universe; the experiences of loss and gain are experiences, the one of the relative inaccessibility of various moments with regard to one another, the other of the discovery of new contents. Birth to the one to whom it occurs is an experience, a character of the universe which simply is, eternally; to the onlooker it is another experience, also eternally posited; death means simply the boundary of an eternal series of experiences which have a common character or bear certain teleological relations to one another, and possibly an experience of rebirth and memory of the preceding experiences on the part of another moment in the "future life," also eternally actual. Thus the distinctions of past and future are, at bottom, equivalent to the distinction between existent pulses of consciousness which eternally undergo certain experiences with regard to one another. Nothing really moves or happens, but things feel as if they were moving or happening.

This theory is often regarded as having a decided emotional advantage over the common-sense view. But if we realize just what the theory implies, our judgment on this question will depend on whether we are optimistic or not. For not only "forever shalt thou love and she be fair" and all the glories of ancient Greece and Rome be conserved in the eternal, but also forever shalt thou be rejected, and all the crime and misery of the darkest eras be enacted and bemoaned. In this metaphysical city of the dead, all evils as well as all values are conserved.

Essential to the understanding of the meaning of the question is the realization that we are not here concerned with any Bradleyian existence of the past, *in a transmuted form*, within an absolute and eternal experience, nor with its existence in an eternal and time-inclusive specious present, such as is described by Professor Royce. Our past experiences transmuted, or even simply included within the absolute, would not be those experiences as we lived them. An experience which included all other experiences would be another than they. Our inquiry is whether, in all their limitation, particularity, and exclusiveness, the past moments of experience exist. Our question is: Does the infant's cry in the

night exist in all its felt distress and ignorance?—not, Does it exist as known or seen by the sympathetic yet satisfied absolute? The existence of the one is different from the existence of the other, and it is only with the former that we are here concerned.

The distinction we are making is no false abstraction of the “mere understanding.” It is one which we have to make in order to be true to the nature of consciousness and to avoid contradiction. It is impossible to hold that the finite consciousness is a part of the eternal moment. For to the finite consciousness a certain limited region of fact (A) is known; to the absolute consciousness there is known all that the finite consciousness knows and everything else (A + B). But it is impossible to know the whole and *only a part*. Knowledge and mere ignorance cannot be united. In vain does one appeal to the transitional experiences of growing in knowledge, or to the double consciousness apparently present in remorse and correction of error. For here, although, to be sure, we have a sort of combination of ignorance and knowledge, of sin and virtue, we do not have a union of *mere* ignorance and knowledge, *mere* sin and virtue. Unless the world realizes a contradiction, *mere* ignorance and knowledge are never combined. I cannot commit a fault, believing it to be a good deed and doubting not of the truth of my conviction—a common experience—and also doubt. Yet just this sort of contradiction, we are told, the absolute realizes. In vain also would one remind us that every false proposition we hold implies all true and false propositions, and thence reason that our ignorance implies a complete knowledge. For the reasoning is not cogent, since it argues from the implication of propositions to the implication of the knowledge of propositions; and secondly, if cogent, it would not prove the point in question. For it assumes, what cannot be proved, that complete knowledge would *include* all partial knowledge; where the inference rests on the ambiguity of the term knowledge, which means either the object known or the knowing of it. Complete knowing involves knowing the part; it does not necessarily involve *being* the knowing of *only* that part.

The same contradiction appears in the use of the specious present to illustrate the possibility of this view. Take the favorite instance of the melody. It is reasoned that because we can

grasp many notes at once, the absolute can include the whole of time at once, that is, the total series of experiences. But it is one thing to know at once an infinite series of objects—which, as Professor Royce has proved in his Supplementary Essays, is possible—and quite another thing to include an infinite series of experiences. For, to keep the illustration, to be a finite knower means to know only *one* note. Now the absolute cannot know *only* one note and also know all. 1, 2, 3, 4, . . ., I might know together, but I could not do this and also know *only* 1, 2. An omniscient consciousness might, besides, exist throughout time, and at each moment know the whole time series, but it would not thereby, and could not, be the whole series of conscious beings which fill time.

The problem before us is also not that of the existence of the past in the present in the way we have shown to be actual. As we have seen, certain elements are stable, persisting through every moment. In memory, and to a diminished extent in "report," still more of the past is conserved. Such parts of the past are always present. Now, to use the language of Hegel, all this "*Aufbewahrung*" and "*Erinnerung*" of the past in the present is unquestioned, and remote from our problem. We ask, does the *whole* past exist, does every moment, as we have defined it, exist? In terms of our illustration, do all the areas which represent the time series exist as they do on our paper, or does only one? Does the whole past life of you and me, does the whole of history, exist? Our question is not whether the past in some sense or other exists now, but whether it exists as it did exist at all. *Is Washington, not now, but then, still crossing the Delaware?*

How shall we answer this question? Plainly we can do so only if we answer the broader question, How do we know whether anything exists or does not exist? Let us ask this question about certain well-known objects. First, how do we know that we ourselves exist?

We know this because we have an idea of ourselves and because this idea is filled out in our immediate experience of ourselves. In one whole of experience we are both the idea of ourselves and ourselves also. We ourselves are taken up into

the idea. In any conscious moment, we experience the fulfillment of the meaning of this idea. This verification of our own existence does not, however, differ in kind from any other verification. No more than when we verify the being of mathematical ideas by obtaining an experience of clear and adequate fulfillment of meaning do we compare our ideas with our objects by getting outside of our ideas. There is no third consciousness which looks on and compares our idea of activity or existence with its object and sees that they agree. The experience is single, an experience of the fulfillment of an idea—a perfectly definite and unique experience. Of course by a reflective act we may know both our idea of ourselves and the object of that idea, and make judgment that the latter was fulfilled in the former. But, as a rule, this judgment is after the fact. Thus we know our own existence directly, by getting a vivid and full idea of the self in the self.

The knowledge of the existence of my fellow is just as direct as that of my own self. I know that my fellow is active or exists, by possessing vivid and full ideas of other-experience. My knowledge of him is no inference from his bodily states. It is as direct as any knowledge can be. I possess ideas which themselves speak, and laugh, and think, but it is not I who talk and smile and reason to myself, but my friend; these ideas, although they are mine, are *cognitive* ideas. They announce the being of another; they refer to, they mean, that other's presence. Separated though we are from each other's being, we are not therefore alone, for our ideas are not all mere pictures which simply come and go, outwardly resembling other objects of which we know nothing; some of these ideas not only are and resemble; they mean, they know. Of course our ideas of our fellow's thoughts are always accompanied by ideas of sound or motion. But our own thinking likewise always has a sensuous medium and setting, yet we do not infer our thinking from these accompaniments. Just so our ideas of our fellow's thoughts are as directly cognitive as our ideas of his movements. If we cannot know a man's thoughts directly, how can we know his movements? If the one are pictures without a cognitive function, why are not the others? Thus we know the existence of our fellow by possessing vivid ideas which announce his being.

Now, if applied to the past, this test of existence is not successful. I have, for example, an idea of my past self. This idea of course exists, and it contains elements of that past self to which it refers. Yet it *means* a whole, of which it is itself but the smallest fragment. And that meaning cannot be fulfilled. However vivid and accurate my memory, it never contains the whole of life that it means. Our memory announces the subject matter of our childhood's sorrow; it tells the reasons, and perchance we judge them right; but it does not weep to us. This which is true of our own past, of which we possess more vivid ideas than of aught else, is *a fortiori* true of all other past objects.

Yet, is failure to find an object real proof of its non-existence? If I look in a room for something and do not discover it there, may the fact not be that it is elsewhere? In order to prove that I searched for a non-existent phantom, I must have reason to believe it there or nowhere; which belief must rest on grounds of a different character from mere inability to discover it somewhere. A negative particular, to be demonstrative, requires support from a universal. Again I watch the candle burn down. Suddenly it goes out. Do I rightly believe that the light no longer exists, because I cannot recover the sensation? It has gone from my mind, to be sure; and in all its fullness I cannot recover it. But what warrants the universal disjunction—a sensation must be in the mind or nowhere—which forms the major premise of my conclusion? Is inability to discover a proof anything more than just inability to discover?

Perhaps we may think of ourselves with reference to past and present as of a man confined and shut from the sight of nature in a single room of a house through which hitherto he has been free to wander. He can see only the single room; yet he retains the memory of the whole. The present is the room, the past is the rest of the house. Now, because the man can see only one room, will he argue that it alone exists? Will he not rather believe that not only that exists which he meets in the "progress of his experience," but also that which is implied by what he meets? This is essentially Bergson's argument for the existence of the past. The present, which we perceive and hence know to exist, implies the past, just as one room of a house implies the

whole; wherefore, just as from the sight of one room we reason to the existence of the house, so from the existence of the present to that of the past. The past is inaccessible, not non-existent; just as is—to change the illustration—the other side of the moon. Perception or implication in what is perceived, is the test of existence.

Doubtless the present does, in some sense at least, imply the past. The man implies the boy. But whole man and whole boy cannot coexist in the same present, just as two bodies cannot occupy the same space. In part, to be sure, they are identical, yet in much they are incompatible. Nevertheless, just as two bodies can coexist in different spaces, contiguously, so perhaps that part of the boy which is impenetrable to the man may coexist with him, not in the present, but *in the past*. Perhaps the past is a fourth dimension of reality, where all things, all thoughts, and all feelings which we suppose to have perished, still persist.

The foregoing argument is plausible, and I admit that mere inability to find or find anew is proof not of non-existence, but of incompetence. But the cogent argument for the non-existence of the past is positive, not negative. For we have a direct knowledge not only of existence, but of the disintegrating of existence. The passing away of elements, we have seen to be the prime character of temporal experience. We are now in a position to interpret this experience more narrowly. It is the experience of the becoming non-existent of a part of ourselves, of our fellows, or of nature. The immediate content of experience does not pass suddenly from presence to pastness; it goes through a transitional stage. We can experience this in the doing of any deed. The deed is not simply posited and then gone; it is "doing," arising and disintegrating. We have the same knowledge of the passing of the existence of the consciousness of another. We observe the emerging and dissolving of his emotion, his coming to understand our thought, his passing from one topic to another. No one, of course, has ever observed his own non-existence; been conscious of his own unconsciousness; witnessed the disappearance of his entire self. Yet such an experience is only the unattainable limit of quite undeniable and commonplace experiences. We do experience the wavering of our consciousness. The content it em-

braces may become increasingly small in extent, intensity, and vividness. This occurs in falling asleep. To be sure no one has ever observed himself *fall* asleep; the passage from consciousness to unconsciousness is a chasm which no consciousness can bridge. A limit may come after all the members of the series of which it is the limit.¹⁸ Thus the idea of one's own total non-existence, when the "earth-forgetting eyelids keep the morningless and unawakening sleep," is a limiting concept irresistibly forced upon us by the experiences of the partial loss of much that one calls one's self. But the idea of the total non-existence of a self, of his having once existed but as no longer existing, is derived chiefly from watching one's fellow fall asleep or die. Here one passes from a condition where one gets ideas which denote consciousness or activity, through a state where those ideas are less numerous and increasingly less active, to one where no such ideas appear. Has consciousness become inaccessible, just as the consciousness of the man in China is inaccessible, or has it ceased altogether? The former supposition rests on the misinterpretation of this experience.

It rests on the confusion, already noticed, of the experience of passing out of the self with the experience of disintegrating within the self. It is a different experience—that of turning the head when certain elements of the landscape leave our view, from that when the light is extinguished in our view. Contents not only come into and go out of the self, they arise and break up within it. We know that the latter have not gone elsewhere, because we know that they do not exist to go. The mind is not a stage on which thoughts and feelings flit to and fro; it is just the totality of these themselves, and their supposed disappearance is really their perishing.

One reason for this confusion is the apparent "return" of thoughts. When the time of rest comes, we leave the thoughts that busied us during the hours of labor. The next morning they crowd upon us, seemingly quite the same, and we greet them as old friends. Moreover, they do not return like memories, pale

¹⁸ For the conception of non-existence as a limit, see Boodin, *Time and Reality*.

and incomplete; they return full-blooded and whole. Over and over again we think the same thoughts. And the identity of the self is destroyed and the plain deliverance of consciousness falsified if, in deference to preconceived theory, we assert that the thoughts are new, but their meaning old.

Well, just as the thoughts of yesterday could be disintegrated, those same thoughts can be reintegrated. The same thoughts *form anew*. We can observe their new formation, just as we observed their origin and decay. Existence is a creation and a birth; it is also a re-creation and a rebirth. When elements and their complexes disappear, they do not need to be preserved in some pale limbo of the past, in order to reappear. To think so is evidence of bondage to the crude metaphysics of substance, in ignorance of the fluid and resilient character of reality. Creation, partial annihilation, and partial re-creation are the nature of reality. The man exists not at all between dreamless sleep and awakening. Yet, in the morning, identically the same man re-exists. Of course not the whole man, for part of him will have perished irrevocably. Only such elements can re-exist which are compatible with the changing present. Still, in part, our life is a continual resurrection. There is mystery in this, only in the eyes of those who accept a crude prejudice. It is the rendering of our most intimate experiences.

As for the implication of the past by the present, it is of course a fact. Yet the implication is not of existence. Since the total past does not exist, it must affirm something else of the past in relation to the present. That which is really implied of the past is the truth that it *did exist*, or the character of *having existed*, and to this truth we pass not by mere implication, but by direct experience.

We do so in this wise. The experiences of the dissolving of content are the lines which connect present and past, existence and non-existence. Our immediate experiences are known to us as existing. Our memories tell us of content which does not exist, which yet stands in a most intimate relation to what does exist. Even as we make this observation we observe the slipping into non-existence of the existent. It is through such experiences that we connect the idea of existence with what our memory tells

us does not exist. For in such experiences we seem to combine, as it were, existence and non-existence. The transitional experiences lead us to make the judgment: this which does not exist, *did* exist. Through the category of the becoming non-existent we pass to that of the *once existed*. This idea of existence which attaches to that of non-existence is the category of *had existence*. When *is* unites with *is not*, it becomes *was*. "Was (were)," "did exist," is the category of the past.

We are not seeking an explanation of the categories of passing and becoming, or of "did exist" and "will exist." We do not hope to convince anyone who says that the existent and non-existent he understands, but that which is *coming into* or *passing from* existence or *once did exist* he does not understand. We know the reason *why* he does not understand: he seeks to construe an ultimate category in terms of something else.¹⁴ Yes, *change*, *becoming*, *passing away*, and their derivative, the *was*, are ultimate categories. They are the categories of our time experience. Whoever denies them must treat time as an illusion. One must either understand or deny time; one cannot explain it. What is ultimate we cannot interpret, for there is no vantage point from which to survey it. That is mysterious for which, although it can have no explanation, we seek to find one. Mystery gives place to understanding as soon as we cease to seek for the reason of the ultimate premises.

Besides the actual observation of the disintegration of contents, we have another indication of the non-existence of the past. The past possesses no longer one of the prime characters of existence. Whatever exists changes and grows, and never attains completion. It is ever developing itself and, interacting with other existents, is a force in the world. In short, it is active. The past, on the other hand, is complete, and cannot grow. Out of the present, to be sure, is being precipitated always more of the past; new chapters are added; but the significant thing is that the old are finished. The living can make their mark, but the record of the dead is complete. And only so far as present, is the past a force in existence. Unlike the total present, the total past does nothing. In short, the past is inactive. Accordingly,

¹⁴ Compare Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Bosanquet's translation, p. 265.

corresponding to the activity of the existent and the inactivity of the non-existent, I shall hereafter refer shortly to ideas which know the former as "active," and to those which know the latter as "inactive." And since ideas, so far as adequate, resemble their objects, these distinctions denote genuine characters of them. For just as the objects of the one kind are fluid, while those of the latter are static, so are the corresponding ideas.

Not only do we thus have positive proof that the past does not exist; we may also urge that the notion of its eternal actuality contradicts the entire meaning of the temporal experience. This is especially clear in the case of our volitional experiences.

Thus, in distress we strive to get rid of pain, we do not seek merely to get a painless experience. Our primary effort is to destroy the pain. Our aim is to annihilate the old, not to institute something new. The distressed will would not be satisfied merely to produce a relieved will, if itself were to exist nevertheless. We do aim to be free from pain, but we assume that such freedom guarantees the non-existence of pain. The efforts of the painful consciousness are not so altruistic as to aim only to produce a sense of relief in another consciousness contiguous with its own.

The obverse of this experience is made equally ridiculous, if one accepts the view of the actuality of the past: I mean the effort to retain a pleasant experience. That view would have to interpret this as the attempt to create in another experience what one experience possesses. But of course it is the effort to prevent the experience from disappearing altogether. It clings to what is behind; it does not push something in front.

The meaning of our creative activity is likewise falsified by this view, if extended to make the future exist as well as the past. The artist or the practical man is aiming to make something absolutely new; to bring into existence, not merely to stand in some sort of teleological or other relation to what does exist. However vivid and compulsive his ideal may be, he is aware that it does not exist; that the work of his will is realization, a making real, not a mere static being, related as eternal condition to an eternal actual product.

Surely if our making, growing, gaining and losing experience is static and eternal, our experience is illusory and falsifying. We mourn not over the merely inaccessible, we mourn for what is lost; our hopes are not in a joy that is actual, but in one that we genuinely create. We grow; and in growing, we are not a mere series of eternal experiences that greet one another across the intervals of the time-stream. For in growing we also outgrow; and we find something that existed not before; we both gain and lose. We are not a whole series of selves, but one self.

Accepting as proved the thesis that the past does not exist, we have, finally, to answer the question which precipitated the entire discussion. If the past does not exist, how can we know it? In reply, we point out, in the first place, that we unquestionably do know many things of which existence cannot be predicated. The mathematical entities are illustrations. Our knowledge of these is fully as adequate as our knowledge of the past, yet they clearly have no existence. One might, to be sure, assert that when we know them they come into existence. They then have what Brentano calls "intentional inexistence" in the mind: that is to say, there then exist ideas which mean them as their objects. Yet they have no independent existence; as mere ideal objects, they cannot exist at all. They are not, and never could become, concrete experiences, which they would have to be in order to exist.

Now, the case of the knowledge of the past is similar. That the past has ideal being is unquestionable. Possession of being is requisite for the being known of any object. We cannot ask if in this sense the past is real. If our ideas of the past have any meaning, any sense, they refer to an object which has at least logical being. The object referred to by any idea which has meaning, that is, which does not involve a contradiction, has being. We prove the being of the object of our ideas by an attempt to get adequate, fully realized ideas,¹⁵ or, where this is impossible, to make sure that our ideas do not mean objects which are with themselves or with other objects contradictory. Thus to prove the being of the color red I seek an experience which

¹⁵ It is a postulate, that adequate ideas cannot be contradictory. For example, mathematicians prove the consistency of postulates by "finding" an object which realizes them.

shall satisfy or fulfil all that I mean by red; in other words, I see the color. Here I mean all that I experience and experience all that I mean. If on the other hand I wish to make sure of the being of the grey matter of my brain, I am careful to discover that my meaning does not contradict other well-founded meanings and is, in addition, the only meaning that makes the total physiological knowledge of my body harmonious. Intermediate are such cases as our ideas of physical objects like a desk, where we can get partly adequate ideas, but for the rest rely on the consistency of our ideas with the remainder of our knowledge.

Just so, we are sure of the being of the past. We cannot, of course, realize our meanings; but we can, within limits, ascertain that they are not self-contradictory. Later, when we discuss historical verification, we shall pursue this subject further. It is sufficient here to indicate that knowledge does not imply the existence of the object known, but only its being. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that to possess any objectifying idea, so long as it is not self-contradictory or inconsistent with other meanings, is to know the object meant by that idea. To possess objectifying ideas is all that can be meant by knowledge. Now, we possess such ideas of the past. The possession of these ideas is knowledge of the past. Whether the objects of these ideas exist or not, is indifferent. In order to know, the ideas of course must exist; the total object meant by them need not exist. The memory of our past is not the total past remembered. But, so long as our memory refers to an object, is a genuine, that is, a consistent meaning, it knows its object.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL TRUTH

The past does not exist, yet can be known,—such is the conclusion of the preceding chapter. The possession of objectifying ideas is the knowledge of the past; whether the object of those ideas exists or not, is irrelevant so far as mere knowledge is concerned. For the past, at any rate, has Being, that is, a determinate character which we can imitate, can embody in our ideas.

This *what* has "intentional inexistence" in the idea; in the knowing experience we are aware of it as a character that belonged to a complete experience that has disappeared. We have thus shown how we can know the non-existent past. But our account of the knowledge of the past has been decidedly incomplete. Much is yet to be made clear. Having determined the possibility of a knowledge of the past, we have next to enquire what that knowledge would reveal if it were as complete as possible; in other words, what the ideal of history is, the nature of Historical Truth.

The effort to determine the ideal of a knowledge so fragmentary as that of the past may well awaken a *quid juris?* The rationale of such an endeavor is, however, as follows. We reflectively consider all that our actual knowledge reveals; we then observe that there are certain lacunae in this revelation, blank places which would have to be filled in order that what we do know may be itself complete; these blank places thus do not go unwitnessed; their being is testified to, inadequately: just as the map of a country, while accurately reproducing the shape of the boundary, and other features, also hints that there is much which does not appear in the drawing; or just as from our knowledge of the law of the whole number-series, we are aware of the being of more numbers than we have ever observed. This implies that our ideas can *mean*, can know partially and inadequately where they do not know completely. Now we project an ideal of knowledge, by *supposing* that where our ideas are insufficient, there they are complete, where they are obscure, they are clear. We take a survey of the whole field, and imagine that the whole is possessed of all the details which it implies but does not present. We apperceive a formal structure, a scheme of relations which itself implies more; we then say: This outline *completed* would be the whole, the Truth.

Our first task in determining the nature of historical truth is the settlement of an important controversy. Is history a natural science, a branch of psychology interested in the analysis of past mental states and the ascertainment of their laws, or an appreciative science, aiming at the living understanding and criticism of their meaning, or intent?

The answer to this question is, we believe, that it embodies a false disjunction. Both the psychological and the appreciative treatments of history are necessary for the fullest knowledge of the past. For each represents one of the two fundamental kinds of knowledge, or rather one of the two aspects of complete knowledge. Knowledge is ideally a universal concept filled with an individual representation; it is a unification and a presentation; a meaning and an image. It demands the individualization of a concept through, if possible, the very object itself, or else through a concrete representation thereof,—image, picture, map, etc. The one side presents the individual object itself, the other exhibits its identity (or its relations) with other objects. Now, each of these functions may be emphasized at the expense of the other. The emphasis of the one results in classificatory, abstract, analytic science; the emphasis of the other, in concrete, biographic, appreciative science,—at the extreme limit, in *art*. There are many gradations between the extreme limits of each. The psychological treatment of history is of the former kind. It seeks to find universal concepts under which to subsume men and events, thus establishing laws and causal *explanations*. In so far as psycho-physical laws are possible, it connects the life of individuals and societies with physiological and physical facts. It differs from abstract psychology, which deals with mere conceptual contents, because it asserts that contents of such and such kind and character "did exist." The object of pure abstract science is eternal, for the mere concept cannot, as such, exist.

Only when we consider states of consciousness not as mere ideal contents, but as individualized in an existence, do they become an object of historical science, a piece of the past. To be sure, this existence is gone, it is not eternal, for it is just that which arises and passes away and cannot be recovered. Yet the truth that existence did attach to a given ideal content is eternal. Such truths are the objects of history. That the complex of describable characters which we call Lincoln did exist, that it did mean and will and do something whose effects we appreciate to this day, that is an historical truth or fact. Psychological history does not seek to reproduce the past; nor does it aim merely at embodying the ideal and eternal being of the past; it seeks

to incorporate a complex of truths or propositions, which indeed truly are, eternally, and which assert that psychic being of such a nature did live and die. History becomes appreciative, when we take our memories, and whatever other objectifying ideas that we can get which refer to the past, and revivify them. We fill out the abstract truths with a concrete life. As Simmel says,¹⁶ appreciative history is a *Nachahmung* of the subjectivity of others, only this subjectivity does not exist. Unlike the direct assimilation of the subjectivity of our fellows which is the testimony to their existence,¹⁷ this *nachbilden* is, like the drama, an evoking of an activity which corresponds to no existence. But, unlike the drama, history imitates an activity that did exist. Caesar did live, whereas Peer Gynt did not. The active ideas which make up our concrete knowledge of the past, of our fellow's existence, of a fictitious character, have in each case a specific and well-known *nuance*. We are aware that the active ideas which give us even the fragments of knowledge of our fellow man when he speaks to us in an ill-understood tongue (to make the cases parallel in point of inadequacy of knowledge) differ from the active ideas which the historian awakens in us in order to make some figure of the past live again for us, and we are also aware that both kinds of ideas differ from those which we derive from a dramatic performance where we learn the character of the hero. These differences express respectively the three propositions which always, in such cases, come under our apperception: "he exists," "he did exist," "he does not exist." Appreciative history thus takes its place alongside of the imitative arts which deal with life. It is a make-believe, a curious and cunning effort to re-create an experience of other-activity which does not but yet did exist. As Simmel says, it requires the same imitative and sympathetic imagination employed by all interpretative and creative arts.

Thus both Münsterberg and his opponents are right. The two kinds of history are complementary. Each gives what the other lacks, and neither is dispensable. The concept and the intuition, science and life, are not antagonistic; the one gives a

¹⁶ *Geschichtsphilosophie*, p. 240.

¹⁷ See pages 143, 144, above.

part of all objects, the other the whole of a single object. Yet Münsterberg's¹⁸ criticism of Rickert's¹⁹ view that history and psychology differ only in that the one deals with the individual, the other with the universal law, is unanswerable. Science does seek a knowledge of objects as well as a knowledge of laws. Its aim is nothing short of acquaintance with the universe of all entities, individually and in their relations. Rickert's theory of science would be good if it were frankly pragmatic. For the needs of life, the short-hand formula, we admit, is the prime object of interest. Knowledge of the formula enables us to predict and prepare. But to satisfy our scientific craving, knowledge of the entire "*unübersehbares Mannigfältigkeit*" would have to be added. And, besides, the law is not a mere tool useful for purposes of simplification.²⁰ It gives us the form of objects, and this form interests us for its own sake. Science seeks knowledge of series of objects, together with the laws of such series.

Rickert has room for only a subjectivistic view of history. For him no true units can be given to the historian; they can only be created in accordance with his interests. So many historians, so many units. Yet units are really given. They are the self-felt unities of the single volitional acts of individuals whose lives history aims at reproducing and re-enacting. All such teleological unities are the matter of history. To be sure, in accordance with our limited purview and sympathies, our actual history selects. But it is not for this reason creative, but partial. Its limitations are regrettable. They are due to us, not to the object. Rickert's efforts to reinstate the objectivity of the historical unit, and to find a basis for the selection of historical material by appealing to transcendent norms, is futile. The standard of knowledge is the object, not the interests of the knower. The form of history is not a transcendent value, but those truths which assert that such and such individuals did exist. The business of history is simply to reproduce and vitalize these

¹⁸ *Grundsüge*, drittes Kapitel "Die Welt der Werte," sechste Abschnitt, § B.

¹⁹ *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, drittes u. viertes Kapitel.

²⁰ Compare Rickert, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

truths. The more of these truths it embodies, the more comprehensive it is, the more perfect its work.

Although the individual volitional act is the starting-point, the unit, it is not the goal of history. History aims at understanding the meaningful connections of the activities that have gone. It traces the influence of one act on another within the life of a single person, and through the lives of others. It sees how the ideal of one moment is carried out in another, or fails to find fulfilment, then only to reappear perhaps in a later and more hospitable age. It re-enacts the struggle and the victory of aims. But the daily aspirations and routine life of the man on the lonely farm are not less its proper object than the fate of the Caesars or the tragedy of the Cross.

The fact that appreciative history re-enacts the individual intent as it lived, in all its narrowness and ignorance, and also sees that intent in all its relations to the other intents which knew, imitated, or contended against it, gives rise to a problem. When the self is seen in its interrelations, is it not another self? When the momentary will is understood in the light of its basis and ultimate issue, is it not another will from that which half blindly resolved and acted? Is not the contrast between the self as it understood itself and as we understand it, one that cannot be healed? If we know the subject in its relations, do we not cease to know the subject as it actually was? If you destroy its loneliness, do you not destroy its essence? History cannot know the individual as he was, if it knows him as related. The thing apart and the thing as related are not one and the same.

Of course there might be a purely individualistic history, which would strive to re-create the personality just as it lived, without interpretation or understanding. It would record the judgments of the persons themselves upon themselves or upon one another, it would not itself judge of the truth or falsity of these, or add its own judgments. It would not assert what the influence of one intent upon another actually was; it would merely record what the first intent hoped its influence would be, and what the other felt it to be. Such history would be difficult, but would it be impossible?

Yet this would plainly not be the whole of history. And the contradiction in keeping both points of view, the individual and the universal, is only apparent. It is solved if we keep in mind that truth is not existence. Truth might include existence, but it is more than existence. Truth gives relations between existents; the concept as well as the individual; and by existing an individual does not destroy that which is true of him, nor do these truths destroy his actuality. The truths about a person are no more he than the relations of a thing are its individual being. The similarity of two colors is not those colors, although it "is" between them.

Thus, Kant's purposes and thoughts as he lived them, as he transcribed them in the "Critique of Practical Reason," were his actuality. That actuality of course is gone, and cannot reappear. Yet "that it existed" is an eternal truth. This truth in its isolation might be the object of some very "objective" and impartial biographer. Kant as he was when writing this Critique would then be reproduced. And the effort of another historian in tracing the influence of this work, in judging of its success or failure, in showing how, unknown to its author, it was destined to influence all later ethical speculation and even to reappear in a doctrine which the old philosopher would have been ashamed to recognize as his offspring, would not in sooth reproduce Kant's existence. But it would reproduce the "truth about Kant." Kant as understood is not Kant's past existence, but Kant's ideal and eternal essence. But the two Kants, although thus genuinely separated, are not opposed or unrelated; for the one Kant is the truth about the other. The individuals as understood, and the teleological relations between them, did not and do not exist; yet they are. They are eternal truths which do not pass away. The man passes away, the truth about him does not. And although the individual, isolated person disappears, the truth that he existed does not. There is only one proposition that is not eternal, namely, that 'A exists. Yet this becomes "A existed," which is eternal. The truth that all truths are not eternal is the truth that there is change. Thus there are two sets of truths, separate but not opposed, which history may reproduce:

the truth that A existed, which tells us what he was as he saw his own intent and blundered accordingly; and the truth which is true of A, that he did err and that his error resulted in the sleep of science for nearly two thousand years, which tells us how A would appear if known and interpreted by a final insight. Both existential and ideal truths are the legitimate objects of history. They are side by side and in peace.

Here we have the solution of an apparent contradiction springing from the nature of relations. When I think of Aristotle, as I did a moment ago when I wrote the last paragraph, did he not become a different Aristotle? for as he was, he was not thought of, for my thought did not exist; but now that I think of him he has entered into a new relation which was not true of him then. Two entities are not one and the same unless you can predicate of the one all that you can predicate of the other. Thus every time I think of Aristotle, it would seem, I do not think of the same Aristotle, for Aristotle thought of is not the same as Aristotle not thought of. The absurdity results from again confusing truth with existence. My thinking of Aristotle did not enter into his existence; for it itself did not then exist, nor can it enter into his existence, for his existence is now gone. But that I now think of him is *true* of Aristotle, and it was true long ago that I should think of him. In other words, although my thinking of Aristotle did not exist when he lived, and forms no part of his existence, that I this day think of Aristotle is part of the eternal truth about Aristotle, which is true, not now or then, but eternally. This truth is part of his ideal essence, being one insignificant detail of his vast influence. Thus his essence is unchanged by my thought; for that essence is eternal and includes the truth that he was the subject of my thought on this day of Grace; and his existence is unchanged, for it does not exist to change, and the truth that he did exist in the way he did is consequently unchanged. Hence when I think of Aristotle I may think of the truth that he existed, without thinking of his essence which includes my being. And even if I did think of that essence I might think of only a part of it. An intent can fixate a part of being without thereby destroying it. I seldom think of my thinking.

The case is similar, although less complicated, when I think of abstract objects. Suppose I think of the number One. Do you say that the number One has become other because formerly it was not thought of, while now it is, thus entering into a new relation? And do you ask which number One I am thinking of? The answer is that there is only a single number One, which is unaffected by my thinking, just because it is eternally related to all knowers. The truth that One is known to me is one of the relations which are eternally true of One. This relation does not come into existence when I think of One; for it has no existence and is not in time. Being known to A, to B, to C, is part of the being of One. It is as eternal as One is. The whole truth about any term includes all its relations, and these relations extend to every moment of time. Only after all time is "in," so to speak, is the whole truth extant. And it is just this whole truth that constitutes the realm of eternal being. Extending over the whole of time, it is timeless, and hence unaffected by change. It anticipates, as it were, all change. But although every ideal entity is thus related to the whole of being, and when we know it we mean it as a member in this whole, still we may by means of our selective intent fix upon it apart from its relations. Such selection cannot affect the nature of what we know when most of its relations are external. One such external relation is just this knowing act of ours, to which indeed the ideal entity is related and which has been anticipated, so to speak, in its eternal status, but which may be ignored by our knowing process.

To return to our own field, history, and to express briefly the results of this discussion. There are two sets of truths, the eternal and the temporal. The former is the totality of all true propositions that may be asserted of any given individual, which propositions include its relations to all other individuals and to every ideal entity. It is the individual's total significance. This truth stretches over all time, and when we refer to it we mean it thus in its timeless completeness. Ideal history could only be written after the entire time-process was completed. Hence it is unaffected by change and has anticipated our own knowing act. Our knowledge, however, need not include this whole truth,

but may selectively reproduce a part. The second group of historical truths is of the form "A existed"; they have become such through the becoming false of the correlative proposition "A exists." They state what A *was* in his actuality, that is, as he was apart from those relations of which he was necessarily ignorant and which did not enter into his consciousness. They reproduce his mere actuality, they view him apart from his ideal significance. They are themselves eternally true, but they are true only after he has perished, just as the proposition "A will exist" is true only *before* A becomes actual. The actuality of the man, which is reported by these truths, is not the same as his ideal being; the former passes away, and the truths which report it are not the same as the latter. Yet they are, after he has gone, eternal like the latter and are together with the latter.

The paradoxes which beset the monistic absolutist theory of truth, paradoxes so ably and frankly set forth by Joachim²¹ in his *Nature of Truth*, and common to his own, to Spinoza's, and to Professor Royce's views, arise through seeking to make the existence of an individual a part of the ideal truth about him. They do not distinguish the individual, as his own actuality isolated him, from that actuality as viewed in all its relations and in its bearings on what is meant and striven for. If we do not seek to join what nature has put asunder, the contradiction disappears. This, to be sure, results in a duality of truth; but at what gain? Clearness and comprehension. Error will not fit into the scheme of truth, nor sin into a man's true self. That A erred is a truth which is no part of the truth about which A erred—although, since in being all things are together, it is related externally to that truth. A man's mistakes in arithmetic are no part of numerical being; were this truth not fixed and objective, it could not serve as a corrective of his mental process; in fact, he could not err at all. Nor is a man's life as he lived it part of that ideal judgment upon him which beholds him in the light of all history. He is not part, but topic, of his reckoning. Were he a genuine part of this judgment, he would have to be aware of it, for his existence is his awareness; and if so, he never would have erred.

²¹ *The Nature of Truth*, chap. v.

History as an appreciative science has to meet the charge of subjectivity. This charge, we believe, is due to a confusion between an ethical judgment upon history and history as we have viewed it. The tracing of the interrelations of purposes, the setting forth how the aim of one period of a man's life influenced that of another period, how his acts affected the acts of contemporaries and successors, and, looking back, how they in turn were influenced by the deeds of his ancestors,—this threading out of the mutual reference of intents and resulting actions is as objective as the study of a crystal, and may be entirely unbiased by ethical judgment. Still, albeit something different from this, an ethical judgment upon history, as Professor Santayana claims, may be objective and non-individualistic. As he represents it,²² such a judgment would take as standard the ideals which were implicitly recognized by the men of the past themselves. The historian would not foist the ideal which is mandatory upon himself upon men of alien traditions and nature. The ideal which gives the "ought" to conduct is primarily individual, it is relative to the endowment and nurture of the person; it is universal only secondarily, where genuine interests meet, as they do in the case of man, on the basis of similarity in organization and environment. Such ideals, one for each life and overlapping where they may, are, we believe, part of the eternal world. Their being and authority become known and felt by every reflecting conscience. An ethic that is liberal and individualistic is not therefore antinomian or anti-social. Because the good differs in part for each individual, it is none the less insistent, and leads just as surely to the service of the many. A pluralism of ideals is not a denial of ideals. Although ethical truth is a relation in the form "A is good for B," it is no less true; for this relation has eternal truth. There is always an absolute standpoint. "Vieler Edlen nämlich bedarf es, und vielerlei Edlen, dass es Adel gebe!" On the basis of a knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the men of the past, the historian can discover their ideals, can even come to know them better than the men themselves did, and can judge them accordingly. Such judgments form, we believe, a genuine part of history; for the relation of the

²² *Reason in Science*, pp. 258, 259.

individual to what he ought to have been, forms part of his eternal significance.

The ethical reading of history is subjective, only when the historian judges the individual from the standpoint of that ideal which may be, to be sure, authoritative for himself, but has no validity, or only partial validity, when applied to another. When such judgments result from ignorance of the relativity and plurality of ideals, they are trivial and contemptible examples of ethical autocracy, and, being false, form no part of history. Still I am far from denying place to the sincere expression of repugnance for an alien ideal. Such an expression, when it understands itself as an utterance of private taste, and does not mistake itself for an ethical judgment, is a legitimate manifestation of personal life; and where in practice ideals are really conflicting, and compromise is no part of the good of each, such utterance is courage and duty. And these judgments have their proper place in history; for that the purposes of A or B are repugnant to mine is a part of the interrelation of aims which history records. They must, to be sure, be recorded in history; what they cannot do, is to serve instead of history. Their importance is relative to the personal weight of the historian, which compared with that of all other individuals must be but insignificant. Their legitimate place is not in the genuine ethical judgment upon history, but in that part of the subject which simply records individual interests. There they would probably find themselves as some among many insignificant statements of personal preference.

Again, it is charged that the *forms* of history are subjective. Simmel compares an historical narrative to a work of art. Those brief summaries of a century, those bold *aperçus*, which are so fascinating yet so untrustworthy, seem like the painting of a landscape, to be constructed by selecting what elements you will and rearranging them to make a pleasing and unified effect. Unquestionably history, as it is written, is selective, and the form is largely adapted to our aesthetic interests and our limitations of view; but it is not for this reason subjective, in the sense of failing to report the truth. If I choose to consider only the even numbers, my neglect of the odd numbers does not falsify

those that I do consider. If I discover the relations between 3 and 27, and am intentionally oblivious of their relations to other numbers, I may not, to be sure, be able to find out all the truths about the relations of 3 and 27, but I can at least discover some. Or if in front of a window I take my stand in such a way that some ugly buildings are shut out from my view, and what I do see thereby gets a grouping that pleases, I none the less see as it is what I do see. History may be partial and artistic, but none the less true. To sum up an age in a sentence requires that one leave out much that is true, but so long as what is said is true, it is unobjectionable. Moreover, such surveys are necessary. Only by means of them can one get a truth that covers a wide range of facts. Such truths must be abstract, and consequently can find expression only in brief compass. But the abstract is none the less true; it may reveal the form or the law of a whole series of particulars. One does not need more than a few sentences to express the truth that Greek philosophy passed from a stage of cosmic to ethical and logical speculation, then united both in Plato and Aristotle, and finally became eclectic and religious. Brevity does not militate against truth, and the most universal truth of all may be the briefest.

CHAPTER VI

HISTORICAL VERIFICATION

We have briefly sketched the ideal of historical knowledge. This ideal nowhere appears complete in human experience. Only fragments of it are toilsomely won. We now turn to the question, by what means do we get possession of these fragments, how do we assure ourselves that they are genuine? What is the process of historical research and verification?

It is no part of our task to go into the details of this subject. They belong primarily to the business of historical science and, although of interest to us, cannot come within the scope of this paper. We shall seek to make plain only a few leading epistemological principles, which lie at the basis of all growth and verification of knowledge, in their relation to the cognizance of the past.

By Historical Truth we have meant the ideally complete whole of historical knowledge. By true ideas we mean ideas that embody any part of this Truth. The test of the truth of ideas must be internal, or intrinsic. Since the idea is not the object, and we never escape from our ideas, we can only compare idea and object if we accept as a fact the power of the idea to reveal the object. But how do we know that this revelation is true and not that of a lying prophet? There are two indications. First, the idea must be adequate, consistent, self-satisfying, luminous. It must give us an experience of what it means, and mean nothing other than we experience. It must not suggest anything more than it says, hint of any thing which it does not impart. Secondly, what the idea claims to reveal must be consistent with everything else, which other ideas claim to reveal. It must fit into a consistent whole. As soon as a contradiction is revealed in our objectifying ideas, they cease to objectify, they no longer claim to report being. Like witnesses caught in a falsehood, they blush and confess their deceit. In regard to simple, unrelated ideas, the question of consistency cannot arise. Complex ideas which seek to unite incompatible objects, to put one into a context into which it does not fit, are inconsistent. Thus the simple idea of blue cannot be inconsistent. Its truth consists in its adequacy: the fact that when we "look at blue," as we say, we have an experience which announces itself as an experience of object, and does not, so far as blue is concerned, suggest that anything more *could be* experienced; this self-fulfilling cognitive experience is what we mean by looking at the object. On the other hand, the complex idea, "the commensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square," is inconsistent, because it seeks to place the numerical value of the ratio between the two lengths in the series of rational numbers, to which it does not belong. The inconsistency of a complex idea usually arises through want of adequacy in its constituents. As soon as it was discovered just what we mean by the elements of the idea which served as our illustration, the inconsistency was discovered, and, in addition, the right relation of its parts. Thus, in the end, the test of the truth is the adequacy of the idea,—seeing is believing. Consistency itself must be transparent in the complex idea. Perfected

knowledge must be self-luminous. Even if certainty could be maintained only by a dialectic of premises implied by every denial of them, this would still be the case, for the evidence that X implies not- X would, in the end, be intuitive. Since most of our ideas are complex and inadequate, we could probably never determine whether they were consistent or not, if we did not have with us a stock of simple ideas—those of the sense qualities and the simpler relations, some of which form a part of every complex idea. The making of these simple ideas adequate by securing the appropriate experiences and the consequent revelation of inconsistency or its absence (so far as we can thereby discover) is the process by which all hypotheses in science are tested.

Now, in those cases where it is impossible to have some of the elements of a complex idea adequate, the difficulties of verifying ideas are of course enormous. In the case of the past, we possess such self-satisfying ideas only, and perhaps doubtfully, with regard to the immediate past. Moreover, most of our ideas are extremely fragmentary; they mean a large range of facts, but report little detail. Our memory, for example, which is the basis of all our knowledge of the past, refers to a mass of experience, tells us that there was such a mass, but informs us of only a decidedly few events. Now, since our ideas are thus inadequate and partial, what is the basis for our confidence in what they do reveal? Moreover, since the past is inaccessible, even non-existent, how can we verify our ideas at all? Again, all our supposed verifications of history are made apparently by present or future facts: how can we verify the past by the present or the future?

In the first place, all evidence that there were any past events is necessarily contained in the objectifying ideas which in one way or another *mean* the past. The fact that we have an idea of the past is the only possible testimony to the being of the past. Whatever an idea announces, so long as it does not contradict any other idea, we must accept. Unless we do this, we can have no knowledge at all. For the possession of objectifying ideas *is*, we reiterate, just knowledge itself. So long as ideas do refer to an object, even if they are inadequate, that is, even if

they do not reveal the whole of every feature of what they mean, they must be accepted as revelations of being. The witness of ideas must be accepted until proved contradictory. There is no proof which is not an ontological proof.

This does not mean that the test of truth is the satisfaction we find in our ideas individually, or in the consistency of a set of ideas, or in their usefulness to us as a means of ordering experience. Nor does this mean that our will is expressed in our ideas. We cannot help possessing these objectifying ideas; we do not determine that contradictory ideas no longer objectify. These things are with us as our bodies are; we do not choose them, we cannot get rid of them; they compel our assent. We may or may not be satisfied with our ideas. The consistency of our objectifying ideas may please us if we are interested in science; we hate it if it contravenes our wishes or other non-objectifying ideas. We cannot choose what we shall believe to have been our past. Objectifying ideas are reflexes, not volitions. The truth of our ideas of the past cannot be reduced to their efficiency as tools for the ordering of experience, for the reason that they announce the *being* of the past, which is their true cognitive function. The objectifying intent of ideas is ignored by the instrumental and phenomenalist theories of truth.

But if any objectifying idea is accepted, cause must be shown why others are not. One such cause might be that only the ideas of self and other present objects are adequate. One might refuse to believe in anything not immediately experiential. Thus one might refuse to believe in all but the immediate past. But such a standpoint is in reality untenable. The ideas that we verify here and now, announce a being that is related. They reveal the relations of these objects to other objects, the ideas of which, to be sure, are not adequate, yet are nevertheless present. Now, relations without end-terms are contradictory. An adequate idea of A-related is contradictory unless the B that is not adequately presented, or some other such object, is accepted. You cannot accept A as father unless you accept B as son. The case of the past is parallel. All our ideas of what we adequately verify, either of our own or of our fellow's experience, reveal an existence which is related to much that does

not adequately appear, although it does appear inadequately. The deed that I do to-day appears as implied by another deed from which it sprang. The purpose of my fellow, as I perceive it now, comes to me as part of a series of purposes extending somewhere beyond what I see. My friend at the marriage with no preceding love-making or agreement *de convenience* is a contradiction. I have as adequate a knowledge of the implication of this situation by other situations as I have of the situation itself. Although I do not have an adequate idea of that other, I must accept something whose general character would fill in the blank which the nature of the relation perceived involves.

But, so far, this proof that the past did exist betrays the insufficiency of all ontological proofs of existence. The purposes, whether my own or my fellow's, which I verify do indeed imply the *being* of other purposes; they do not imply that they did exist. For plainly we have purposes which imply deeds in the future, yet these deeds are not actual. And similarly the deeds of a man who dies in his youth, when part of a coherent scheme of intentions, imply countless others which are never realized. It would seem not to be contradictory of what we know of existence, to suppose that this present, full-grown and energetic, sprang with all its purposes and beliefs, by *generatio aequivoca*, from an absolute nothing.

All this we must admit, yet our admission is not fatal to our contention. Did our present purposes imply others in the past in the same way that they imply others in the future; did our ideas of the past testify only to the being of the past, then our case would surely be lost. But unlike our ideas of the future or of merely ideal entities, those of the past, as we have seen, include the further idea of the proposition "did exist." My idea of the decision which (or something like it) is implied by my present act of writing this essay, reveals not only an ideal essence, but in addition the proposition "it was." But why believe this report? Well, in the first place, there is nothing to contradict it. Unless we believe our objectifying ideas, we have no means of knowing at all. Yet surely the idea of this proposition is not adequate; were it to become so, might not a contradiction appear? Since you cannot adequately verify any past deed

(with the exception of the immediate past), how can you verify any simple proposition of this type? And if you cannot verify any one proposition, you cannot verify any at all; that is, you cannot verify that there was a past. Surely you have not refuted the sceptic, who will believe in that only of which he can obtain clear and distinct ideas! Not yet; but the refutation is at hand. It grows out of the considerations about relations, set forth above. As we know, the essence of our temporal experience is becoming. What we verify now, appears as coming from something else, as growing out of another existence which it supplants. Our idea of this is as adequate as our idea of our own actuality, for our actuality is just of this nature. I never do a deed that does not announce itself as "having come from one that did exist." Without an existence that *was*, the existence that *is* is contradictory, just because it is an existence that *becomes*. Becoming, without something which did exist from which it became, is a contradiction. We have the term and the relation, but the other term that is required is one that must *have existed*, not one that has merely ideal being. Here is a relation that has not mere logical being, but existence, and can exist only if its end-term did exist. The proposition "A becomes," which I verify, implies, not the entity of B, but the proposition "B became." I cannot accept the one without the other. The present grows out of the past; this very growing I verify; the one cannot exist unless the other has existed. Thus the proposition that there was a past is proved.

But since mere existence has being but no existence, since the *that* is never separated from the *what*, the nature of much that did exist can also be demonstrated. The general character of the past can be proved from the present. We verify deeds and relations of a type that demand an end-term of a specific kind. All that we said at first about the implication of the past by the present is now confirmed; for the implication is one that carries with it "having existed" as well as being. The reason why we cannot determine from the present more than the general character of the past, is that we actually verify only a little of the present itself. The fullness of even our own moments, although of course it exists, is verified only to the smallest extent. We

verify only the general features, and, reasoning from their relations, we can determine only the abstract characters of the end-terms.

Thus my present deeds imply a decision to write a monograph about the past, but since my memory of the latter is inadequate and my knowledge of my own act is quite as inadequate, I can only be sure that there *was* a decision, of a certain general nature. Moreover, we cannot be sure that the content of all moments has this sort of implication. There is much that seems to have no logical connection with that out of which it grew; at least, no such implication has yet been made out. Hence, although because it too *becomes* it must have come from something that *was*, we are unable to determine *what was*. In so far as our lives are dreamful and incoherent, we cannot trace these necessary relations. For further information we have to rely on empirical psychological methods.

That there was a past, we may be sure. Aside from deduction from the present, our knowledge of it is based on memory, our own memory, the memory of our fellows, and on records, which are nothing but recorded memory. The memories that we at any time possess are few and inadequate; but, as we have seen, their inadequacy need not lead us to distrust them utterly. Especially when recorded soon after the event, memory has a fair degree of accuracy. Growth in knowledge of the past depends upon getting richer memories, upon gathering objectifying ideas from our fellows and from records. Since, because of the feebleness of the mechanism of memory, we are unable, for the most part, to render our ideas of the past adequate, we can verify them only one with another and so see to it that they are not inconsistent. Consistent memories, living or recorded, we must needs believe, if we are to obtain any knowledge of the past.

Fortunately, records can be tested in another way besides comparison *inter se*: namely, with reference to the objects of which they make mention. If a writer refers to an event, say an eclipse, we can discover his veracity by finding out whether such an event has a place in the physical series. Moreover, if another writer asserts that he also saw it, we have a means of determining their contemporaneity. We know that the conscious

series is correlated with the series of physical events in such a way that only those experiences which have existed together can obtain adequate ideas, immediate experiences, of the same portion of the latter series. Of course this verification of records assumes the validity of the process of scientific induction. To what extent it is reliable we shall investigate anon. We turn first to consider certain other difficulties which the processes of historical research and verification commonly arouse.

How can records, which are present existing physical objects, inform us of past experiences which no longer exist? This difficulty rests on several prejudices and errors. To begin with, the physical objects may, as we have seen, be past as well as present. Yet even if they are not, the propositions that I discover by reading, say, the inscription on a monument, are a part of historical truth, which is a portion of the eternal world. My reading of the inscription and my consequent finding of these propositions are, to be sure, present facts, but I cannot see that this is relevant to the truth or temporality of what I find. My finding a fact now, does not make *what* I find merely present. So long as we bear in mind that ideas are not what they know, that by their objectifying intent they can refer to anything remote in time or timeless, whether in heaven or earth, it will not puzzle us to know how by an act in the present we can verify what is not present.

Nor is there any difficulty in the fact that I learn historical truth, an "intangible" thing, only by means of hard rocks and visible ink and paper. We have long since abandoned the prejudice that only what we can touch and handle has being. It is no less wonderful that we can by our ideas know books and tables than that we can know propositions. That I cannot know the latter apart from the former is irrelevant. I cannot know anything without a brain or a digestive tract, yet who will say that this fact has any epistemological significance? The processes of psycho-physics are without significance for the theory of knowledge. There is no importance attachable to the fact that before I can get an idea which embodies a proposition, my occipital lobes must be stimulated by ink and paper, and the entire associative apparatus set to work. It is even doubtful

whether when I know a proposition I must also know the words in which it is framed. When the mind is fixed on the meaning, "when gathered into herself," "none of these things trouble her, neither sounds nor sights." At any rate, however I obtain these ideas, whether always in conjunction with ideas of sounds or sights, or not, it is sufficient that I do obtain them. I get meanings, consistent with and enriching my other objectifying ideas which refer to the past. Just as I can accept the testimony of luminous memory, so I can accept other objectifying ideas, however derived psycho-physically. Our knowledge moves within the charmed circle of ideas, in which democratic company the dignity of each depends only on its clearness and its harmony with its fellows, and not at all on ancestry.

Thus, I have an idea, no matter how obtained, that there once existed a man named Socrates, who preached the gospel of the rational life and for various reasons was put to death by his own countrymen. My ideas about him and his fate are, let us say, vague: I know that he made a speech in his own defense, but just what he said I do not know; I know that he taught that virtue is one with self-knowledge, but I do not know how he justified this view. My ideas mean more than they reveal; they crave for the detail of what they do impart. I read the works of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, I get new ideas about Socrates and fill out the meaning of those which I already have. I discover the arguments which he used at his trial, I learn his method of induction and maieutic scrutiny. Are these new ideas consistent among themselves, with all the other ideas which I have about Greek history and Greek character, with my ideas, adequate or inadequate, of human life in general and the world of nature? If so, then I may be confident that what I learn is true.

Memory is fragmentary, and much less than is ever remembered is recorded. Hence, even if we could gather together all that was ever written on stone or bronze or paper, our histories would be imperfect. We fill up the lacunae by means of hypotheses. The validity of these hypotheses rests on the validity of empirical psychic laws, obtained by induction.²³ Here

²³ See Wundt, *Logik der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Bd. 2, Teil 2. Sigwart, *Logic*, translation by Helen Dendy, vol. 2.

abstract psychology helps to make history. At best, induction gives only probable results. Oftentimes two or more hypotheses are equally possible. Because of the so-called plurality of causes, and the uncertainty of effects where the materials for induction are few, many interpretations of history are possible. From a given set of acts testified to by our records, historians can perhaps with equal reasonableness suppose several different motives for the actions of a Cromwell or a Napoleon. Even if psychology had deduced exact laws, we could not apply them with very much confidence to the past, because of the paucity of facts. We could not get sufficient constants with which to solve our equations—which, since mental life is complex, would contain many variables. These facts about historical interpretation are legitimate ground for a measure of scepticism, notably illustrated by Balfour in his *Defense of Philosophic Doubt.*²⁴ Yet they do not make history hopeless. We do possess the objectifying ideas obtained from recorded memory, whose general accuracy we can trust. Of course, even the understanding of records, when their language is not well known, rests somewhat on probability; yet, where the meaning of the words has been transmitted through translations, or through the memory of successive generations, in spite of transformations in the meaning of the vernacular itself, none except the professional sceptic can reasonably doubt that we can obtain a modicum of fairly accurate information. If we could not have well-grounded faith in records, we might indeed be sceptical. But, of course, many versions of history remain open.

Not only the interpretation of records, but also their corroboration and testing by means of the facts in the physical world to which they refer, is derived largely from inference. We can get at so-called physical objects only through memory and inference from the facts which we verify in the present. Thus the validity of all hypotheses in history rests on the validity of inference, and hence, in the end, on the validity of so-called empirical laws.

Empirical physical laws express the laws of series of physical facts. Such laws are uncertain, compared with mathematical

²⁴ Chap. iv.

axioms, because, while in the case of the latter all the data to which they apply are at hand, in the former there is a paucity of data. In the one case, a complete verification is possible: we can see how the law is exemplified in every fact which we choose to examine. In the other case, we can never be sure, even when all the facts at our command fit into our law, that there do not exist within the series in question other facts which would render a different formula necessary, or perhaps make any exact formula impossible. The basis for our confidence in such laws as we do obtain rests on the random character of our facts. They are a chance selection, a fair sample, which may be supposed to illustrate the character of the whole.²⁵ Assuming the law, and having a few facts, we can predict the nature of other facts with a degree of probability proportionate to the number and representative character of the facts upon which our previous induction was based.

From a deterministic point of view, whether we infer physical facts in the past or the future is indifferent. Of course one end of the series, through memory, is more accessible to us than the other. We might, however, for all I can see, have had some sort of prescience by which we could divine so-called future objects. As it is, we simply dip into the world of facts; through perception and memory, we find different kinds of series, many times repeated perhaps, and guess as best we may what laws they would exemplify if we could find all the facts which belong to them. Whether by means of our laws we infer, from a few facts now, other facts in the future or the past, is indifferent: we are simply referring to different ends of the series to which our facts belong. Thus, whether from the laws of the solar system I infer to-morrow's or yesterday's sunrise is indifferent, so far as the process of inference and the degree of probability are concerned. The only difference is that I can verify to-morrow's sun, but not yesterday's.

The inference of psychical facts seems to be on the same plane. Even if from empirical psychic laws we are unable to determine the existence of concrete states of consciousness, we can nevertheless determine the *possibility*, the *character*, of such activity.

²⁵ Compare Charles Peirce, *Studies in Logic*.

We can determine that if *A* existed, or if *A* will exist, he was, or will be, of the character *B*. Existence, even if contingent and arbitrary, is subject to possibility, that is, to abstract determination. And a possibility of existent character is just as determinate and lawful an entity as a stone or a reflexive relation. Just as we can discover the nature and behavior of bodies when in certain relations, so we can determine the nature and reactions of psychic facts. The matter of psycho-physical parallelism is irrelevant: the correlation of psychical objects with physical objects is simply another fact about each. If the law of correlation were completely determined, I could pass from a fact in the psychical realm to a fact in the physical realm, and, if of the appropriate nature, from a neurosis to a psychosis. If the correlation is accurate, and there are determinate physical laws of the brain, there are corresponding psychical laws. The facts from which we can deduce such psychical laws are given to us by memory and perception, just as physical facts are given to us. Hence, from them we can deduce the laws of the possibilities of physical existence, and in turn infer other concrete existences.

But we are not, in the case of the past, restricted to mere possibilities. For, as we have seen, we know that there was a past, and we also know that certain events took place in the past. Since existence must conform to possibility, we can infer that these events must have been of such and such a general character. In accordance with our empirical psychic laws, we can make the probable inference that if *A* occurred it was of the character *B*, because *A* could not exist unless it were also *B*.

To sum up: we verify and enlarge our knowledge of the past (verification and growth in knowledge go hand in hand) by enriching the meaning of such objectifying ideas of the past as we possess, through seeing that these ideas are consistent with themselves, with one another, and with such other ideas as we derive by induction to fill in the lacunae.

CHAPTER VII

HISTORICAL TRUTH AND EXISTENCE

Historical research and verification are the processes by which we win historical truth. They are matters of faithful effort and creation, the bringing into existence of something new, occurrences unique and novel in our changeful lives. In contrast with this coming and going of our ideas, we have often spoken of the truth as fixed and changeless. Even though this very search for truth is part of history, yet the truth about this search does not change. The truth that contemporary events would happen might have been known to the discerning prophet long before their occurrence. When he made his judgment he had an object—the truths in question. To be sure, the events did not exist, but the truth about them was eternally, else it could not have been foreseen. Whoever judges, no matter when, judges about being; whoever entertains an objectifying idea, refers to that which is.²⁶ That we do not know the whole of this truth, is of course itself a truth; and that we often err, is another truth. "History is always badly written and always has to be re-written." Is it not then a mere assumption that this truth is? Nay, even the truth that we know only in part and that we err, itself implies the being of truth. The part implies the whole, and false propositions imply true ones.

"But surely," it will be objected, "one can, in a way, make a mistake about things which do not exist. For example, I can have a false idea about a Centaur, which is nothing but a creation of the nightmares of early mythology. Or I can err about transcendental forms of space, which are not real." To this the reply is, that we are not considering being real, but only being. To be sure, Centaurs probably are not real, that is, do not exist, and multi-dimensional spaces cannot as such exist. Yet, for all that, they are. The Centaur is at least a possible existent, that

²⁶ Compare Brentano, *Psychologie*, loc. cit. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, first series, lecture VII.

is, the conception of it involves no contradiction; hence, at least this truth has being, namely, that it might exist. And what after all is a possibility? Is it not an entity? But suppose the Centaur did involve a contradiction; it would still, as a contradictory conception, as an attempted union of simple objectifying concepts, have being. It is at least a fancy of the poets. Multi-dimensional spaces equally have being. They are objects of knowledge; we can quarrel and err about them; surely one does not contend or make a mistake about nothing.

From our point of view, nothing exists save the totality of concrete experiences which are present at a single point in the time series. The men and women of the past and future do not exist; neither do ideals and fictitious entities. Yet for all this, we assert the being of the past and future, namely, of all the characters of those that did or will exist, their mutual relations and influences, their several various or identical ideals, and, last—that which distinguishes this realm from that of an interesting drama—the proposition that these characters did or will exist. And we also assert the being of the laws of physical objects, of all universals, of mathematical and logical entities, of fictions, of ideals, of the relations trivial or important between any and all these things. There is no snobbery in the society of being!

Being that is not existent, being that is not the same as ideas of being, truths, propositions which are not somebody's judgments,—such conceptions seem, to many, metaphysical monstrosities. Moreover, the dualism between existence in time, and being that is eternal, will be to many intolerable. What is this being that does not exist, it will be asked; what is its support in the real world?—what is its relation to time? Is it not a mere abstraction, a *χώρισμος* as illegitimate as Plato's? These protests of monism cannot be disregarded. In order to investigate their legitimacy, we shall examine some attempts at construing truth and being in terms of concrete existence; always with especial reference to Historical Truth.

In what way shall we seek to make truth identical with existence? The phenomenalist will endeavor to make it one with the ideas which mean it. But whose ideas are the Truth? Surely

not those of any one of us. The ideas of historical truth, for example, of even the learned historian are confessedly fragmentary. Even we, to be sure, knew enough to enable us to define certain characters of the Truth; but we meant more than we knew. Our intent overreached our accomplishment. We were aware of how much more our own knowledge implied. Secondly, the Truth is plainly one, whereas we knowers are many. Last, our knowledge perishes; but the Truth passes not away. It does not affect the truth that John Smith lived and died in some obscure town, that in a few generations no one will know that he did exist. We cannot make the being of our own unrehearsed dreams dependent on our memory, which will soon perish forever at our death.

If the Truth is not the knowledge of any one of us, it is not the combined knowledge of all, a totality of objectifying ideas. You cannot get the Truth by piecing together errors. Since the views of each are a part of history, if history were a static and eternal immediacy, this might be true. But since parts of the immediate mean other parts, since they recognize and fall short of ideals, and since they all perish in turn, they cannot be what they mean, cannot be what they aim at, cannot be the eternal. Moreover, the totality of these views would have a being unknown to any one of them.

Another view is that of Professor Royce, expounded also by Joachim in his recent book, *The Nature of Truth*. The truth consists of the finite and partial views together with a complete view, united in one whole of consciousness. Historical truth is truth about men who have played their parts in life, ethical truth concerns the ideals of willing subjects; neglect that about which truth is, and you cannot understand it at all. Apart from fact and will, truth and ideal are meaningless abstractions. Complete interpretation of the fact, complete understanding of the will, is the Truth. But truth is not mere fact and will, nor mere reflection and ideal, but fact and reflection upon the fact, will and understanding of the will; for in order to know completely, one has also to be what one knows.

We need not stay to examine this view in detail. It involves all the contradictions flowing from the conception of one con-

sciousness supposed to include many others as parts of itself, and also the false epistemological thesis that the true idea necessarily possesses the existence of its object. We have already dealt with it when we examined Professor Royce's conception of the eternal and time-inclusive moment, and elsewhere. Moreover, there is no need of our again setting forth the difficulties of this theory when it has been so convincingly done by Joachim himself in the last chapter of his book. We shall only call attention to one thing, which we could not have considered before we had proved that the past does not exist. Since finite consciousnesses pass away, a further contradiction breaks out in the Absolute Self—he is at once an eternal actual whole, yet his parts become non-existent.

There is still another way of construing truth in terms of knowledge or existence. The truth about the past is *what* we mean when we study history, it is the goal of the objectifying ideas which arise when we enter upon research or let our memory wander as it will. It is *that which* gives our ideas their significance; it is what our ideas would become if they were complete. It is, to be sure, not actual; it is only an ideal, a potentiality; but it is such as to be capable of realization, and apart from the intent of conscious beings it is not at all. Thus although the Truth is not identical with any knowing process, it is not independent of all such processes.

Much that is contained in this last view is true, almost to the extent of being obvious; but it is not very illuminating, and it embodies some errors. Of course the Truth is that which we mean; it is the ideal which we strive to realize. And just as the artist could not paint a picture unless he had something to copy, and to serve as a standard, so we could not know unless we had an ideal of knowledge. But just as the model need not perish if the artist ceases to paint her, so the Truth cannot cease to be if our meanings vanish. Suppose that to-day all ideas were to disappear; still the truth that these ideas were, would be. Moreover, if, as is said, the Truth does not depend upon each idea severally, A's or B's or C's, how can it depend upon any? Indeed, it is impossible to make truth depend on anything that can pass away; for, as Professor Santayana puts it, if nothing

existed it would still be true that all existences were wanting; but it cannot be true that there is no truth; for to assert this involves a contradiction.

But, after all, what is a mere potentiality, possibility, ideal? Is it anything else than a vaguely conceived entity which bears certain relations to the actual? Thus, the ideal of knowledge is something which I conceive as what I might attain, given certain conditions; my ideal self is a definite character which is what I most deeply wish to be. That is, possibilities and ideals are well defined entities; when you call them ideals and possibilities, you simply state something about them; namely, the truth that they might become actual, or that they are what we want. But in order to be an ideal or a possible existent, a thing must first be. You cannot make its being dependent on its also being an ideal or a possibility. It is not merely what we mean or what we want; for it is granted that our meanings and wishes are vague or erroneous. In fact, this view simply defines some relations which eternal entities bear to the existent, and then takes this account as complete. But you cannot adequately define a thing by telling its relations to other things. A related term has some individuality of its own. Thus this attempt to construe truth in terms of existence or knowledge turns out to be abortive.

We turn to one final effort. In the *Sophist*, Plato makes the Stranger put this query to the "friends of the Ideas": "We want to ascertain from them more distinctly whether they further admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known." To which Theaetetus replies: "There can be no doubt that they say so." After another question and answer, the Stranger says: ". . . But they will allow that if to know is active, then to be known is passive. And on this view, being, in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm. . . . And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness, an everlasting fixture?"²⁷ Plato not only anticipated all criticism

²⁷ The *Sophist*, 248 sub. fin., Jowett's translation.

of his own theory, but in this passage he indicated the course which future thought would take in reference to the Ideas. Aristotle, who believed that he had refuted Plato and dispensed with the Ideas, simply endowed them with the activity and life of which Plato had spoken in the *Sophist*, and put them into a different locus—the intellect of the Prime Mover.²⁸ On its philosophic side, the Scholastic conception of God was descended from Aristotle, and it identified God's omniscience with the Truth. Finally, Leibnitz, a christianized and idealistic Aristotle, made the eternal truths the thoughts of the Supreme Monad. Such, in brief, are the origins of what we believe the most promising of all attempts to construe truth in terms of existence. Is there any difference between a single complete and enduring knowledge and the Truth?

In the case of Historical Truth there seems, at first sight, to be no difference. What, we may well ask, is the truth about a man, but that which would appear after a complete knowledge of him and his influence? To understand the influence of Plato on Aristotle, one must somehow get both within a single unity of apperception. Have these relations any being except just such an understanding of them? What is the ethical judgment upon a character, except a living appreciation of the man as he was, together with a comprehension of his ideal—what he ought to have been? Is there any being in the proposition, "Socrates did exist," other than a sense of loss that does not pass away, together with the memory of him?

Let us elaborate this concept of the All-Knower, in such a way as to fashion it most like the Truth; then we can judge of it, whether it is only a copy or the original. This Being would possess ideas which reproduce all the past and anticipate all the future. The character of all the persons that had ever lived or would ever live, together with their ideals, that is, together with what they most deeply strove to be, and also the judgment of how far they realized or fell short of these patterns,—all would appear in the ideas of the All-Knower. Thus he would be at once Recording Angel and Just Judge; only, he would assign

²⁸ Aristotle's concept of the potential—which is nothing but a proposition about an existent—is another guise in which the Ideas reappear.

no punishments or rewards, nor would he have any preferences or emotions that were not expressive of the ideals of the wills of the persons themselves; he would simply understand and sympathize. Our relations to him would be just what our relations to truth and the ideal are, namely, imitation and devotion. By our ideas we should imitate his ideas, by our self-knowledge and striving we should seek to realize what he eternally knows to be the intention of our true wills. As Aristotle has described him and our latest Aristotelian corrected and added to the outlines, he would be the Unmoved Mover who attracts but does not impel, whom we love, but by whose action we cannot be helped. For, being the reflex of all interactions, he could not himself interact with the world. His causation would be ideal or final, never efficient. Our relations with him, of knowledge, or of love, would also be purely ideal; they would, however, be entities, and so be part of his knowledge. But they would not make us part of him, for by hypothesis he is ideal being, not transient existence.

Thus the life and aspiration of every person would be fixed in the eternal memory or anticipation. These ideas would be, of course, for the most part inactive; they would announce only the ideal being and truth of the past and future; the ideas which reflected the present would alone have the appearance of activity. These last would be the counterparts of existential judgments—they would correspond to the propositions “A is” and “A exists,” together. When the person died, the idea would become inactive and would take on the color of the proposition “A existed.” Similarly, the anticipatory ideas would in turn become active and then inactive again, as the future became present and then past. There would be two parts of the eternal consciousness. First, a complete knowledge of both past and future—the data of memory and anticipation fully understood in all their interrelations throughout the entire infinite course of time: this part would correspond to the eternal truths. Then there would be the region of ideas that would simply reflect the past and future, and the present, the latter ideas being active: these ideas would be subject to change; they would embody the existential propositions, which change from “A will exist” to “A exists,” then to “A did exist.” These two regions

would exist side by side, just as the flowing river exists alongside of its stationary banks. The Eternal would then be a witness to the drama of life, possess perfect memory of its completed acts, and an accurate prescience of its developments, together with a masterly understanding of the significance of the whole—the most attentive onlooker and the most consummate critic. The “spectator of all time and of all existence,” he would be the perfected philosopher. Unlike Aristotle’s Prime Mover, he, utter Citizen of the World and Democrat, would not disdain the most trivial detail: the ideas of “even the meanest things”²⁹ would form part of his consciousness. Unlike the God of popular tradition, he would have no emotion just his own; his would be wholly that of sympathy with the world; for besides knowing of its joys and sorrows, its right judgments and its errors, he would also completely understand them and what they together verily meant.

Yet since Being, unlike existences which are many, is undoubtedly one, for all entities are related, the All-Knower, besides his acquaintance with existence, would be the complete mathematician and logician, beholding with the mind’s eye every universal as well as every individual entity, and aware of all the infinite interrelations of things, including even the “trifling propositions,” every conceivable combination of fancy or caprice, every possibility of existence or thought despised by James and Locke. In this region of pure contemplation, the All-Knower would have a life apart from ours. For whereas our science is a copy of detached squares of the patch-work quilt of Truth, his would be a vision of every piece in its well-stitched place. Only, since this consciousness is the Truth, there would be in it no more emotion or delight, no more fatigue and transition and ill self-consciousness, than there is in sunlight or in a purely ideal triangle. In this region of pure Being would be united the Aristotelian *νόησις νοήσεως* with the Platonic³⁰ and Christian concern for the world of change and existence.

But if the All-Knower is aware of change, must not eternal truth itself change? Would not the eternal be temporal?

²⁹ See the *Parmenides*, 130, Jowett’s translation.

³⁰ Compare the *Laws*, 901.

Well, part of the Truth does change. If time *is*, all of truth is not unalterable. Existential propositions change, as we have indicated; we cannot exclude these from the realm of the Truth. If time *is*, there is no whole of truth which is eternal; for existential propositions become false. There is only one part of truth which is eternal; namely, the significance and ideal inter-relations of all beings at all points of time. But only after the time process is completed will this eternal Truth be the whole of truth. And is not the All-Knower, as we have described him, true to this side of truth as it *is*? For he possesses, through memory and anticipation, this eternal insight which o'erleaps all time, in addition to the consciousness of time and change. That a consciousness combining felt permanence with felt change is possible, our own finite consciousness exemplifies: we feel, for instance, along with the passing away of elements, and the coming in of new, that what we call our "identity," be it purpose or only some persistent organic sensation, does not change.

Such an entity would indeed seem to be indistinguishable from the Truth. But throughout our description of it, we have really given it a false character. We have called it a knower and a consciousness, yet these epithets do not rightly belong to it. For each implies the relation of the object known to something else and different, and this has no place in the eternal being. That being was only the knowledge of its object, between which and its object there was no difference; it had no life of its own to which the object could be assimilated. It was just the complete object itself, and the deceitful plausibility of our procedure was due to the fact that the idea, considered in itself, apart from the rest of the self in which it may exist, in the case of perfect knowledge *is* identical with its object. Hence, in describing the adequate *idea* of the Truth, we have done nothing but describe the Truth itself, not a Consciousness in possession of the Truth.

But has the Truth existence? This depends on what is meant by existence. If we mean what has been meant in this essay, *concrete experience*, effective and interactive with other experiences, then the Truth has no existence. For the Truth is just the abstract propositions which we have described; there is no

concrete life in which, of themselves and independently, they inhere, and through which they might become effective in the world. The only concrete experience in which they do exist is our own, when we know them. Only there can they briefly dwell and act. "The truth is mighty and will prevail"—but only if we are devoted and striving.

On the other hand, if by existence is also meant what Russell and Moore (and we, following them) have called Being, then surely the Truth exists. But such existence brings with it, we judge, none of the allurements which men commonly expect. The existence of the eternally abstract warms the heart of the philosopher only. And such an existence merely is proved in the arguments offered by Howison and by Royce. As to the latter, in particular, knowledge of part of the Truth does indeed prove the being of the whole, but not, surely, a living Knower of the whole.

Hence every attempt to make the whole Truth a part of concrete experience has failed. Yet these attempts have not been uninstructive. For they have led us to a sort of Platonic Realism, the elucidation of which seems to us the way to insight. The view of Plato that there is an eternal reality, the essence of all changing experience, has, we believe, never been refuted or superseded. Only, the details of Plato's view must be altered: the realm of Being must be enlarged beyond the limits of the universals, and the Heraclitan flux must be identified with the immediate. This realism has none of the disadvantages of other sorts; for its Being is not unknown, since being appears in our ideas. Knowledge and its object are similar. The work of knowledge, as of action, is that of the Artist—to embody an original which (the landscape is full of the soul of the painter!) is part of his very self. And although we refuse to define the Eternal Truth, repeating to those who clamor for an answer to this hoary demand, Truth is Truth, we claim the most intimate acquaintance with it, an acquaintance which grows with increase of knowledge. Because you cannot construe red in terms of anything except itself, you do not confess to ignorance of it. Just so, when you understand the proposition, "Plato was the author of the theory of Ideas," or the proposition, "Every asympmetrical

relation can be expressed as a symmetrical relation," you apprehend an entity having as clear and luminous a subsistence and character. This you should accept as it declares itself to be, without seeking to give it a nature you do not find in it. When you study history or mathematics, you are wandering in the eternal realm, much as you might wander in Africa; and if you explore well, you make as assured discoveries of that which is, and you must take your discoveries as simply in the one case as you do in the other. The philosopher, although he knows more of the world than the common man, often understands it less well, because his ideas become confused through the desire to see our variegated universe all of a single color.

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